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MATTHEW T. BODIE*
ABSTRACT
No law requires companies to have CEOs, officers, supervisors, 
chains of command, or even employees.  But traditional managerial 
structures are so ingrained in our political economy that legal doctrines 
take them for granted.  What if they were to disappear?  Under holacracy, 
a new version of participatory management adopted at companies like 
Zappos and Medium, companies are replacing managers, organizational 
charts, and subordinates with governance circles, roles, and lead links.  
The promise of holacracy is a system of management that devolves 
responsibilities to teams, empowers workers to act freely within specified 
zones of authority, and energizes the entire organization around an 
evolutionary purpose.  This Article takes holacracy’s fully imagined 
approach and asks how current law would respond.  Looking at corporate 
law, fiduciary law, labor and employment law, contract law, and criminal 
law, the Article breaks down the legal and economic assumptions about 
traditional firm hierarchies and then contemplates how we can reconceive 
existing law and policy to match the purposes of holacracy and its kin.  
Ultimately, holacracy teaches us not only about the possibilities of 
participatory governance, but also the extent to which we assume that 
hierarchy goes hand-in-hand with business entities.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the development of the modern corporation, the law has 
assumed a hierarchical approach to internal corporate governance.  
Corporations are ruled by a board of directors that sits atop the hierarchy.1
The board delegates governance responsibilities to a set of officers, who 
then control the actual workings of the corporation.2 The chief executive 
officer has ultimate managerial power, with other officers below, and then 
executives, managers, and the mass of workers known simply as 
1 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2016).
2 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2016) (“Every corporation organized under 
this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws 
or in a resolution of the board of directors which is not inconsistent with the bylaws . . . .”). 
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employees.  This executive structure plays an especially important role in 
corporate law, as officers owe important duties to the board and the 
corporation itself.3 But the structure shapes the doctrine in other areas of 
law as well, such as securities regulation, labor and employment law, 
contract law, and criminal law.  Most fundamentally, the corporate 
managerial hierarchy informs our legal and societal perspective on the 
nature of the organization itself.  
Participatory management is a common term for those managerial 
methodologies that endeavor to flatten or shift the power relations within 
the traditional corporate pyramid.  These efforts have waxed and waned 
over time, with a previous boom in activity in the 1990s.4 In an important 
recent trend, however, companies are rediscovering participatory 
management within a broader explosion of concern for corporate social 
responsibility and human flourishing.5 These approaches do not fall 
within the established alternatives such as employee-owned companies, 
consumer cooperatives, or non-profits.  Instead, they are for-profit 
companies, organized as corporations, partnerships, or LLCs, that have 
radically restructured the internal hierarchy.  These efforts have been 
accorded various labels, such as “self-managed,” “self-actualizing,” 
“evolutionary,” “integral,” “flat,” and even “teal.”6 They represent a 
movement seeking an economics of fairness, innovation, and 
sustainability as well as efficiency.  
One particular instantiation of this broader movement is a system 
known as “holacracy.”7 Holacracy is a comprehensively designed internal
3 Deborah A. DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 847, 848 
(2017) (discussing the “distinctive” and “crucial” roles that officers play within the corporation, 
including as a fiduciary).
4 For a detailed discussion of these approaches, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 658–59 (1996); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational 
Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 981–82 (1998).
5 For examples of this broader literature, see COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY 
THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT 8-9 (2013); RAJ SISODIA,
JAG SHETH & DAVID WOLFE, FIRMS OF ENDEARMENT: HOW WORLD-CLASS COMPANIES 
PROFIT FROM PASSION AND PURPOSE (2014).
6 FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO CREATING 
ORGANIZATIONS INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 43 (2014) (using 
“self-actualizing,” “evolutionary,” “integral,” and “teal”); Ethan Bernstein et al., Beyond the 
Holacracy Hype, HARV. BUS. REV. 38, 40 (2016) (using “self-managed” and “flat”).  The “teal” 
label refers to the color system used by integral theory to designate various stages of human 
development.  See, e.g., KEN WILBER, INTEGRAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONSCIOUSNESS, SPIRIT,
PSYCHOLOGY, THERAPY (2000); KEN WILBER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF EVERYTHING 27–30
(1996); JENNY WADE, CHANGES OF MIND: A HOLONOMIC THEORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS (1996).
7 See, e.g., BRIAN J. ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR 
A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD 12–14 (2015); Bernstein et al., supra note 6.
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management system that has received significant attention for its adoption 
at Zappos, Medium, and other tech companies.8 Holacracy replaces the 
internal firm hierarchy with a governance process that looks, in many 
ways, like a constitutional democracy.  However, holacracy has a 
nomenclature all its own.  CEOs hand over their power to a system of 
governance “circles”—teams that are assigned specific management 
responsibilities.9 These teams have the power to design and refine 
corporate policy within their jurisdictions.  There is no overarching 
hierarchy to make ultimate decisions or overrule teams; instead, there is 
generally one ultimate governance circle—representing the entire 
organization—that has the final authority.10 The circles manage the 
assignment of roles to workers and oversee their performance.11
Ultimately, holacracy is a combination of democratic republic, Quaker 
meetinghouse, and tech-speak: the system is structured to encourage 
participation by all employees in governance through a carefully designed 
set of roles and opportunities.12
Holacracy has received attention in the national media, popular 
managerial literature, and business school scholarship.13 But the 
phenomenon of integral managerial systems, such as holacracy, has 
important ramifications for the law of business governance.  Much of the 
law surrounding the firm—corporate law, agency law, labor and 
employment law, contract law, and even criminal law—assumes the 
existence of the internal hierarchy in its operations and processes.  If that 
hierarchy is taken away, the law no longer fits neatly into place.  Instead, 
we have to rethink our assumptions about the structure of the business firm 
and transform the law in order to make it fit.  In this respect, the holacracy 
model is a useful tool for reexamining and reevaluating our current legal 
8 Bernstein et al., supra note 6, at 40; see also Roger D. Hodge, First, Let’s Get Rid of 
All the Bosses, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 4, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/122965/can-
billion-dollar-corporation-zappos-be-self-organized; Bourree Lam, Why Are So Many Zappos 
Employees Leaving?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 15, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/zappos-holacracy-hierarchy/424173/.
9 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 46–49.
10 Id. at 46.
11 One such set of roles, known as “links,” connect the circles to one another and provide 
a leadership role within the circle. Id. at 49–55.
12 Id. at 12.
13 See, e.g., Bernstein et al., supra note 6, at 42; Hodge, supra note 8.  Much of the 
business press has been strongly negative on holacracy, viewing as utopian and too focused on 
interaction (as opposed to action).  See Jurgen Appelo, Holacracy is Fundamentally Broken, 
FORBES (July 14, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jurgenappelo/2016/07/14/holacracy-is-
fundamentally-broken/#1731f5201126; Paul Bradley Carr, A Holacracy of Dunces, PANDO
(July 3, 2015), https://pando.com/2015/07/03/holacracy-dunces/; Lam, supra note 8; Felix 
Velarde, Is Holacracy Finally Dead?, QUARTZ (May 16, 2016), https://qz.com/677130/is-
holacracy-finally-dead/.
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systems.  Even if holacracy is only a blip in organizational theory, it can 
nevertheless help us better understand how dependent we have become on 
assumptions of internal hierarchical governance.  We can learn more about 
the role of hierarchy in our current political economy by examining how 
the law might react and adapt to this much flatter system of governance.  
Part I provides an overview of the holacracy system, both in theory 
and in practice.  Part II examines holacracy’s effect on our thinking about 
organization identity and purpose.  Part III discusses the effect of 
holacracy on firm management, looking particularly at the roles of 
directors and officers.  In Part IV, the paradigms of labor and employment 
law doctrines, particularly the labor-management divide, are contrasted 
with the reenvisioned holacratic workplace.  Finally, Part V reconsiders 
the law of entity responsibility, particularly criminal liability, for the 
holacratic firm.  
I. THE HOLACRACY SYSTEM
Systems of participatory management have a long, if limited, 
history, both in the United States and abroad.14 A similarly limited but 
robust academic literature has examined the strengths and weaknesses of 
various permutations of the approach.15 This Article is not a normative 
evaluation of participatory management generally or holacracy 
specifically.  It is instead an effort to understand the particular system of 
holacracy and the ways in which holacracy would interact with legal 
doctrine.  It therefore makes sense to begin by placing holacracy within 
the realm of management methods that undo hierarchies and involve 
workers in governance.  
A. Holacracy as a System of Participatory Governance
Holacracy is only one of a set of relatively recent management 
systems that are designed to transform business hierarchies into flatter, 
14 The last significant bloom of participatory management within firms occurred in the 
1980s and 1990s.  See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 673 (“Over the last two decades, however, 
participatory management has emerged as the principal putative challenger to traditional 
corporate hierarchies.”).  However, efforts to integrate employees into the governance of the 
firm are long-standing.  See, e.g., Clyde Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A 
Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 COMP. L. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 170 (1982).
15 See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 986–90 (providing a taxonomy).  See also 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON EMPLOYEE VOICE (Adrian Wilkinson et al. eds., 2014); Marleen 
A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-
Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 901 (1993).
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW VOL. 426
team-oriented, constitutional structures.16 These organizational forms 
have often been pursued in isolation from one another but share a set of 
common characteristics.17 First, these organizations place much more 
importance on their collective purpose.  Unlike U.S. corporations, which 
generally have dropped any meaningful description of corporate purpose 
from their founding charters, these businesses see their mission statements 
as relevant to every decision that the company makes.  Second, these 
businesses enact systems of internal self-management, rather than 
hierarchical governance, when it comes to firm management.  
Traditionally-managed firms have a strict chain of command from CEO to 
vice-presidents to managers and so on down to the line worker, but self-
managed companies devolve much more power to the team level.  And 
transformational decisions, such as mergers, new products, or supply 
chains, are subject to much greater input from the organization as a whole 
through the company’s shared-governance approach.  Finally, these 
companies generally have decision-making processes that are designed to 
engender conflict but then resolve it.  Choices are made not based on 
hierarchical positions or even majority vote, but rather on a set of 
processes through which the issue is framed, discussed, and then resolved.  
The management literature has surfaced various examples of these 
types of companies—some of which have delved more deeply into various 
aspects of the overall prototype.  The Dutch firm Buurtzorg, for example, 
provides neighborhood nursing care through a system of nursing teams 
that are largely self-managed within the overall organization (with 
currently around 7,000 nurses).18 The company has received worldwide 
attention for its “complete care” approach to nursing that allows more time 
to spend with each patient on a variety of issues.19 Along with this 
organizational purpose, Buurtzorg’s governance model consists almost 
entirely of teams of ten to twelve nurses.  These teams are hierarchically 
flat, with no supervisor or “boss” to coordinate within the group and only 
thin organizational support for issues that might arise outside of the team’s 
16 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 203 (“Holacracy is just one example of a system that 
uses peer-to-peer self-organization and distributed control in lieu of more traditional approaches 
to achieving order.”); Ben Linders, Adding Purpose to Scrum with Holacracy, INFOQ (Jan. 9, 
2017), https://www.infoq.com/articles/purpose-scrum-holacracy (“With Holacracy, the whole 
system is created to make your organisation Teal.”).
17 LALOUX, supra note 6, at 7.  
18 Id. at 65.
19 See, e.g., Adam Brimelow, Dutch District Nurses Rediscover “Complete Care” Role, 
BBC (May 27, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-22450482; The Commonwealth Fund, 
Home Care by Self-Governing Nursing Teams: The Netherlands' Buurtzorg Model (May 29, 
2015), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/case-studies/2015/may/home-care-
nursing-teams-netherlands. 
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expertise.20 The nurses are extensively trained in the Buurtzorg approach 
to self-management, which provides a set of skills and processes for 
resolving the myriad issues that arise within the teams.21 The French 
manufacturing firm FAVI employs over 400 people making automobile 
gearbox forks and other brass and copper components.22 Like Buurtzorg, 
FAVI relies on teams of manufacturing workers to manage their own work 
with little middle management or support structure.23 Coordination across 
teams is accomplished by the teams themselves, working together through 
group representatives to resolve issues, make budgets, and create 
temporary teams to handle more complicated difficulties.24 And Morning 
Star—the West Coast tomato processor, not the investment firm—
produces over forty percent of the tomato paste and diced tomatoes in the 
United States through a system of twenty-three horizontal teams.25 Each 
worker—known as a “colleague”—annually writes a personal mission 
statement that defines the roles that the worker will take on in the 
upcoming year.26 The workers then negotiate with coworkers over these 
roles one-on-one and receive a set of approvals for their proposed 
positions.27
These illustrations demonstrate the commonalities between these 
various organizations that have all made commitments of some kind to a 
self-managed or integral model of management.  Holacracy is different, 
however, in that it is not simply a set of common features between 
organizations; it is instead an organizational operating model that exists 
apart from any one company.28 Holacracy is practiced by Holacracy One, 
the consulting firm that promotes the use of the holacracy system, as well 
20 LALOUX, supra note 6, at 67.
21 Id. (describing the approach, which includes a training course entitled “Solution-
Driven Methods of Interaction”).
22 Id. at 73–74; Patrick Gilbert et al., Work Organization and Innovation – Case Study: 
FAVI, France 1 (2013), 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=intl. 
23 Gilbert et al., supra note 22, at 14 (“FAVI has produced a kind of distillation of many 
of the most recent organisational innovations: the flattening of structures, making employees 
more responsible, the client-focus approach, the calling into question of the usefulness of 
procedures, and the effort to ensure that the decision-making process is as close as possible to 
the action.”)
24 LALOUX, supra note 6, at 75–78.
25 Id. at 113.  See also Leigh Buchanan, One Company's Audacious Org Chart: 400 
Leaders, 0 Bosses, INC (Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.inc.com/audacious-companies/leigh-
buchanan/morning-star.html (calling the organization “flatter than a pancake leveled by a 
steamroller”); Gary Hamel, First, Let’s Fire All the Managers, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2011), 
https://hbr.org/2011/12/first-lets-fire-all-the-managers.
26 LALOUX, supra note 6, at 115.  
27 Id. at 116–17.
28 Id. at 117.
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW VOL. 428
as other companies such as Zappos and Valve.29 But it is not simply a 
catalogue of the practices at those companies; it exists independently as a 
fully-described system.  The structure of Holacracy is laid out in the 
Holacracy Constitution, which provides the core rules, structure, and 
processes of the Holacracy operating system for companies.30 It is further 
developed in the book on holacracy, authored by Brian Robertson, who is 
primarily responsible for designing the system.31 And Holacracy One has 
its own operating agreement available to the public, which provides more 
detail as to some of the legal organizational issues.32 These sources offer 
a deeper perspective into the functioning of this particular version of 
integral or self-managed (or teal) organizations.33
Unlike other management programs that focus on what managers 
do, holacracy is a radical reinvention of the corporate structure.  The 
holacracy approach centers on three main organizational reforms: first, a 
complex internal governance structure that distributes power to 
nonhierarchical groups; second, processes for raising and resolving issues 
within the governance structure; and, third, a focus on purpose.34
Although pieces of the holacracy system can be adopted, the architects of 
the system warn against it.35 However, there are choices to be made within 
the overall framework, and a variety of different organizations can 
implement holacracy with appropriate tailoring.  Even a division or 
department inside a larger organization that follows a traditional structure 
can adopt holacracy.  
29 Bernstein et al., supra note 6, at 43.
30 HOLACRACY CONST., http://www.holacracy.org/constitution (on version 4.1 as of this 
writing); see also Bernstein et al., supra note 6, at 43 (describing holacracy as “the best-known 
and the most fully specified” of the various systems of self-managed teams).
31 ROBERTSON, supra note 7.  
32 Operating Agreement of Holacracy One, LLC (June 19, 2015), 
https://tinyurl.com/yddk9zn3 [hereinafter Holacracy One Operating Agreement].
33 In addition, I also conducted an interview with Brian Robertson, who was extremely 
helpful in providing additional insight into the workings of holacracy in practice.  Interview with 
Brian J. Robertson, author (Mar. 16, 2017) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Robertson 
Interview].
34 Robertson describes holacracy as “a new social technology for governing and 
operating an organization, defined by a set of core rules distinctly different from those of a 
conventionally governed organization.”  ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 12.  He notes that 
holacracy includes the following elements: “a constitution, which sets out the ‘rules of the game’ 
and redistributes authority[;] a new way to structure an organization and define people’s roles 
and spheres of authority within it[;] a unique decision-making process for updating those roles 
and authorities[; and] a meeting process for keeping teams in sync and getting work done 
together.”  Id.
35 Id. at 174 (describing holacracy as “one whole interwoven system”).  Robertson does 
describe steps that organizations can take to move toward and prepare for holacracy.  Id. at 176–
83.
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B. The Holacracy Approach
Participatory management systems generally restructure an 
organization’s internal governance to eliminate hierarchical lines of 
authority and replace them with team- or group-oriented governance 
systems.  Holacracy follows this general approach.  However, through the 
work of Brian Robertson and his fellow partners at Holacracy One, LLC, 
a more fully realized and comprehensive system has been developed than 
these participatory governance structures that have been adopted 
piecemeal by individual firms.  What follows is an overview of the most 
important pieces of the holacracy approach: the constitutional structure, 
the governance processes, and the organizational purpose.
1. Constitutional Structure
Holacracy is grounded in a complex system of governance that 
controls the internal dynamics of the firm.  Like a state constitution, the 
Holacracy Constitution—or the particular variant of it adopted by a 
particular firm—is meant to be the controlling governance document.36 As 
described by Robertson in Holacracy, the constitution is the “core 
rulebook for the organization” whose “rules and processes reign supreme, 
and trump even the person who adopted it.”37 By adopting a constitution, 
the CEO and/or other firm leader(s) hand over their organizational power 
to the processes described therein.  The model constitution has a signature 
page in which the ratifiers—presumably the CEO or the like—agree to 
adopt the constitution and “thereby cede their authority into the 
Constitution’s processes and endow the due results therefrom with the 
weight and authority otherwise carried by the ratifier(s).”38 The legal 
status of the adoption depends on what legal steps are taken to ratify it.  
For example, a signature by the CEO will not ultimately bind a corporate 
board or even the CEO that signed it.  However, if a corporation adopts
the constitution through its legal bylaws or corporate charter, then it could 
only be amended by the processes established under state organizational 
36 The Model Constitution describes itself as “the core rules, structure, and processes of 
the Holacracy ‘operating system’ for governing and managing an organization.  It provides the 
foundation for an organization wishing to use Holacracy, by anchoring the shift of power 
required in concrete and documented ‘rules of the game’, which everyone involved can rely 
upon.” HOLACRACY CONST., Intro.
37 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 21.
38 HOLACRACY CONST., append. A (Constitution Adoption Declaration). 
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW VOL. 4210
law for amending said bylaws or charter.39 The Holacracy One, LLC 
Operating Agreement explicitly adopts the holacracy constitution.40
Although using the term “constitution” to refer to its foundational 
document, the holacracy governance system does not follow traditional 
notions of constitutional democracy in its structure.  Robertson likens 
holacracy to the human body, in terms of one overall organizational “unit” 
that contains many internal operating systems all working independently 
but together.41 The holacracy system carries this metaphor forward but 
with its own terminology for its structures and processes.  Within the 
company, governance is operationalized through a system of “circles.”  
The circles represent both an area of authority—known as a “domain”—
and the roles and accountabilities that operate within that authority.  The 
holacracy system is essentially a series of nested and parallel circles that 
organize the internal processes of the company; these circles are the 
governance structure for the organizations.  Although called a variety of 
names in self-managed companies,42 these structures are essentially teams: 
units of workers collected around a specific goal or purpose.43
The outermost holacracy circle, which represents the purposes of 
the entire organization, is called the “anchor circle.”44 Upon the adoption 
of the constitution, the anchor circle establishes all of the other circles 
within the organization.45 The circles are built to have a specific purpose, 
an established domain of authority, and accountabilities for which they are 
responsible.46 These three aspects are not just for show; they form the 
governance structure.  Each circle has control over its own domains and 
39 Amending a corporation’s articles of incorporation is generally a three-step process: 
the board of directors must recommend the amendment to the shareholders; the shareholders 
must approve the amendment; and the amendment must be filed with the secretary of state for 
the state of incorporation.  See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 14–15 (2d. ed. 
2009) (bylaws can typically be amended only by shareholders, although the modern trend is to 
allow shareholders or the board of directors to amend); HOLACRACY CONST., Intro. (cautioning 
that the constitution is “not a complete set of legal bylaws or a formal operating agreement”). 
40 Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, § 3.1, at 7 (“The management 
and control of the Company and of its business, the power to act for and bind the Company, and 
all matters and questions of policy and management shall be vested exclusively in the due 
process defined in the Constitution, and any decisions to be made in connection with the conduct 
of the business of the Company shall be made by the Managers so authorized in the manner 
provided therein.”).  
41 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 17, 38.
42 Bernstein et al., supra note 6, at 7 (noting that the terms “pods” is used to describe 
teams in a self-managed organization). 
43 Id. (“Whatever they’re called, these basic components . . . are the essential building 
blocks of their organizations.”).
44 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 46; HOLACRACY CONST., art. V, § 2.
45 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 154–55.
46 Id. at 48.
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can veto any actions in those domains by those outside of the circle.  
Holacracy works not simply as a large constitutional democracy but rather 
more like a federalized system of authority in which the smaller units have 
almost complete authority within their jurisdictions.
The same is true for “roles,” which are the smallest unit of 
governance within holacracy.  In some ways, roles and circles are the 
same: both have defined purposes, explicit domains, and expected 
accountabilities.47 However, a role is a sub-unit of a circle and is 
performed by a company worker.  Roles are given specific names and 
defined when they are created.  The role’s domain is exclusive to that role 
(or set of roles) and provides the role-filler with exclusive authority within 
that domain.48 Accountability is the flip side of the domain: the role is 
expected to produce the results that its domain empowers it to pursue.49
So, to pick a trivial example, if the role is “coffee maker,” the role has 
domain over the coffee maker but is expected to make the coffee as 
specified within the role’s accountabilities.
Circles are made up of the roles necessary to pursue the purpose and 
accountabilities of a particular circle.  However, holacracy also includes 
five additional governance roles within the circles.  First, the “lead link” 
is the link between the circle itself and the broader circle that exists outside 
of it.50 The lead link is the connection that insures that the circle is 
pursuing the purpose for which it was established.51 The lead link looks, 
in some ways, like a traditional manager or supervisor, in that the lead link 
generally sets priorities for the circle and assigns workers to their 
individual roles.52 However, once the role has been delegated, the lead link 
has no authority to override the decisions made within the role.  If the lead 
link presents a role with a particular task, the role-filler can turn it down if 
it is outside the role’s accountabilities.  Or the role-filler can fulfill the 
ultimate aim of the assignment in a different way.  Each individual role 
retains control over its tasks, and lead links cannot demand that the work 
be done in a particular way or by a particular person simply on their own 
authority.  Even the lead link in the anchor circle—the closest comparison 
to a CEO—cannot demand that another role do something in a particular 
47 Id. at 44; see also HOLACRACY CONST., art. I, § 1.
48 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 44 (“A domain (of which there may be several) specifies 
something the role has the exclusive authority to control on behalf of the organization—in other 
words, this role’s ‘property.’”).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 49 (“The ‘Lead Link’ is appointed by the super-circle to represent its needs in 
the sub-circle.”).
51 Id. (“A lead link holds the perspective and functions needed to align the sub-circle 
with the purpose, strategy, and needs of its broader context.”).
52 Id. at 52, 57; see also HOLACRACY CONST., art. II, § 2.1.
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way.53 The constitution holds power within the organization and provides 
roles with a significant amount of autonomous authority.  
A second governance role is that of the representative link, or “rep 
link.”54 If the lead link represents the outer organization within the circle, 
the rep link connects the concerns of the circle to the outer organization.  
The rep link is elected by the members of the circle and participates in the 
governance of the outer circle.  The rep link is supposed to be a true 
representative of the interests of the circle as well as a messenger regarding 
problems within the circle that need outside help to resolve.55 On rare 
occasions, a third governance role known as a “cross link” will be created 
to connect sub-circles within a broader circle.56 These roles are created 
only for ad hoc issues that arise between two sub-circles that are best 
addressed outside of the normal governance structure.  The fourth and fifth 
roles are also roles elected within the circle: the “facilitator” and the 
“secretary.”57 The facilitator runs the circle’s governance meetings, and 
the secretary administers those meetings by scheduling them and keeping 
all required records.58
As the foregoing discussion shows, holacracy is not a shapeless, 
flat agglomeration of equally empowered participants.  Instead, holacracy 
seeks to create significantly more structure than the traditional governance 
system and then populate that structure with empowered participants.  
Rather than using a hierarchical organizational tree, holacracy is a system 
of roles and circles that define the purpose of the organization and its 
subparts, the jurisdictional authority of each part, and the expected results 
that each part is designed to pursue and attain.  The hierarchy is “flatter” 
in that each worker has control of her role’s domains and cannot be ordered 
to perform the role’s accountabilities in a particular way.  However, the 
lead links act in similar ways to managers or supervisors, and the circles 
are organized so that important, firm-wide decisions are made by the 
anchor circle, in which only a select group of rep links and roles 
participate.59
We know that holacracy is meant to replace the “CEO and below” 
traditional organizational approach—but what about the board of 
directors?  The holacracy model is ambivalent about the board.  When an 
existing organization adopts the holacracy approach, Robertson 
53 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 22–23.
54 Id. at 49–50; see also HOLACRACY CONST., append. A.
55 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 54.
56 Id. at 55–56; HOLACRACY CONST., art. II, § 2.7.
57 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 57; HOLACRACY CONST., append.A.
58 HOLACRACY CONST., append. A.
59 HOLACRACY CONST., art. V, § 5.2.
2018 HOLACRACY AND THE LAW 13
recommends that it be adopted via the CEO, without official board action, 
because of the “extra complexity of getting board-level buy-in up front.”60
In such a situation, the board exists outside of holacracy—outside of the 
anchor circle—and retains ultimate control over the corporation.  
However, holacracy is also open to bringing the board into the system as 
the anchor circle, at which point the CEO becomes the lead link to a 
general company circle.61 The board/anchor circle is not required to have 
a lead link; instead, the board uses the holacracy decision-making process 
to run the board.62 (A facilitator and secretary would still be required.)  In 
such cases, Robertson suggests that each director become a cross-link with 
one of the general company sub-circles.63 All directors could become 
cross-links to the investor sub-circle, which would make these directors 
similar to the directors in a traditional for-profit company.64 Alternatively, 
they could each link up with a different sub-circle, in the manner of 
stakeholder directors: one could link with key vendors, another with 
customers, a third with employees, and so on.  This second possibility 
would be speculative, Robertson acknowledges, as it has not been tried on 
any scale.65 Moreover, it would put investors in a more precarious 
position.66 On the other hand, investors are already differently positioned 
within holacracy, as the focus of the organization is on its purpose and not 
on shareholder wealth maximization.  In Robertson’s words, “With 
[h]olacracy adopted at the board level, the board does not exist to steward 
the company for the sake of its shareholders, or even for the sake of all of 
its stakeholders, but rather to steward it for the organization itself—in 
other words, for expressing the organization’s purpose.”67
The governance structure of Holacracy One, LLC, provides unique 
answers to the questions raised by the holacracy model.  As the name 
makes clear, Holacracy One is a Pennsylvania LLC, and it takes advantage 
of the significant flexibility provided by the LLC model.68 The operating 
agreement specifically adopts the holacracy constitution and vests “[t]he 
management and control of the [c]ompany and of its business” to the 
constitution.69 The anchor circle is singled out as the site of certain 
enumerated rights and powers, including specifying the company’s 
60 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 151.  
61 Id. at 163.  
62 Id. at 164; HOLACRACY CONST., art. V, § 2.2.
63 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 164. 
64 Id. at 164.
65 Id. at 165–66.
66 Id. (noting that multi-stakeholder boards “tend to diminish investor protections, when 
investors are already legally last in line behind other stakeholders for getting paid”).
67 Id. at 166.
68 Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, at 1.
69 Id. § 3.1, at 7.
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purpose, selling company assets, or prosecuting legal claims.70 However, 
the agreement also purports to eliminate fiduciary duties on the part of the 
company’s managers “to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law,” 
except for the duty of good faith and fair dealing.71 The anchor circle 
works without a lead link and requires a cross-link for the purposes of 
linking up with key stakeholder groups.72 Although the cross-links must 
“remain defined to represent the [m]embers in their capacity as financial 
investment stakeholders in the [c]ompany,”73 their purpose is not to 
maximize investor wealth; rather, it is to express the purpose of the 
organization and insure that the purpose is adhered to throughout the 
organization.74 The organization’s purpose plays an important role in both 
resolving disputes and setting the terms for evaluation.  The board orients 
itself around the organization’s purpose rather than the usual shareholder 
wealth maximization norm.  
Holacracy One, LLC, also defines its workers as “partners” for 
purposes of the LLC.75 All workers receive Class P membership units, 
which provide for a guaranteed draw from the company.76 The Class P 
units can, under certain restrictions, be exchanged for investor shares.77
Because they are members of the LLC, the company does not consider the 
workers to be employees; instead they are like partners or LLC members.78
Partners have governance rights through the holacracy constitution.  
According to Robertson, the move to a partnership model is in keeping 
with the shift in authority and accountability from CEOs and supervisors 
to the average worker.79
2. Governance Processes
Governance processes are critical to self-managed teams, and 
holacracy is no exception.  Along with the governance structure based on 
roles, domains, and circles, holacracy adopts a stylized version of 
governance meetings and dispute resolution which move beyond 
discussions or elections.  The process, described in Article III of the 
70 Id.
71 Id. § 3.5, at 9.
72 Id. § 4.1, at 10.
73 Id.
74 Robertson Interview, supra note 33.
75 Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, § 1.1, at 1.
76 Id. § 7.4.1, at 16; Robertson Interview, supra note 33.
77 Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, § 7.4.2, at 16.
78 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 190; Robertson Interview, supra note 33.
79 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 190.
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holacracy constitution, involves discrete steps taken to raise issues—
known as “tensions”—and then address and hopefully resolve those 
tensions.80
Restructuring the processes of governance is critical to holacracy 
because governance is so important to the holacracy structure.  As 
Robertson notes, “[w]hen you replace top-down leadership with a process, 
that process needs to be robust and sophisticated enough to keep everyone 
aligned and unified as they navigate the complexity of their daily 
business.”81 The circle’s facilitator and secretary largely manage the 
governance processes and implement the decisions arrived at in the 
meetings.82 The meetings allow members of the circle to transform 
existing structures and adapt to changing conditions.  
During governance meetings, participants can: create, amend, or 
eliminate roles; create, amend, or eliminate policies that govern within the 
circle; create, amend, or eliminate sub-circles; and elect members to 
specific roles.83 These meeting follow a strict choreography that allows 
all members to participate but channels such participation into fairly 
specific areas.  For example, during the check-in round, all are invited to 
contribute, but none are allowed to discuss or respond to another’s 
contribution.84 The facilitator leads the group through the process and 
endeavors to resolve any tensions—perceptions of a “specific gap between 
current reality and a sensed potential.”85 A tension raised in the “agenda 
building” session is then addressed through the “integrative decision-
making process,” which provides participants with specific opportunities 
to propose solutions and raise objections.86 Proposals are adopted if no 
objections are left unaddressed in the view of all of the members of the 
group.87 This decision-making process is more fully described within the 
holacracy literature, but its essence is an effort to push people through a 
series of steps to reach an ultimate conclusion.88 The facilitator must 
carefully keep participants on target for each particular round of 
participation and must make judgment calls about when someone’s 
comment is not relevant or when a proposal lies outside the circle’s 
jurisdiction.89 Governance meetings are separate from operations 
80 HOLACRACY CONST., art. III. 
81 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 64.
82 Id. at 66–67.
83 Id. at 67.  
84 Id. at 70.
85 Id. at 6.
86 HOLACRACY CONST., art. III, § 3.5.
87 Id. § 2
88 Id. § 3.3
89 HOLACRACY CONST., append. A
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meetings, and the facilitator should reject efforts to bring in crossover 
material.90 Strategic decisions can be covered in tactical meetings that 
follow a similar format but focus on operational issues and ongoing 
projects.91 The secretary records the meeting’s results; software platforms, 
such as Glass Frog, assist holacracy secretaries in keeping track of the 
governance changes.92
Within the governance process, holacracy employs a unique 
election process—known as the “integrative election process”—through 
which elected roles are assigned.93 The process begins with each person
filling out a ballot—no abstentions allowed—with their nominee.94 These 
nominees are then explained and proposed to the group, and the facilitator 
leads the groups through a winnowing process whereby a final “proposal” 
is settled upon.95 This proposal must then survive a round of potential 
objections; if it does, then the nominee goes through.96
The holacracy process is not simple, and Robertson recommends 
that larger organizations employ a holacracy consultant or “coach” in 
order to get the process underway.97 At the very least, training is necessary 
for all employees, since all employees participate in the governance 
process.98 In this regard, holacracy is very much like other self-
management systems.  Buurtzorg also follows a very specific self-
management process, and all new members undergo training in “solution-
driven methods of interaction.”99 Similar to holacracy, the group chooses 
a facilitator who then leads the group through a process that responds to 
objections, allows all voices to be heard, and settles on a solution.100
Unlike holacracy, however, there is no lead link on the Buurtzorg teams—
all of the nurses have the same governance rights.101 But both processes 
90 For an overview of a governance process, see ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 68–78; 
HOLACRACY CONST., art. III, § 3.
91 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 94–104; HOLACRACY CONST., art. IV, § 2.
92 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 79.




97 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 149–50.
98 Id. at 150.
99 LALOUX, supra note 6, at 67.
100 Id. at 68.
101 But see id. at 68–69 (noting that “fluid hierarchies of recognition, influence, and 
skill” can arise within the group based on individual “expertise, interest, or willingness”).
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share a common understanding that the team and the process are to be 
respected above personal prerogative and individual interests.102
Adapting to a nonhierarchical governance framework can be 
difficult for many employees as the traditional framework relieves the 
average employee of the burden of decision-making and responsibility.103
Moreover, the process can be difficult to understand at first, with each 
system having its unique jargon about “tensions,” “objections,” and 
“domains.”104 But these structured processes for dialogue and decision are 
necessary to prevent the team-production process from descending into 
chaos.  
3. Organizational Purpose.
The idea of “purpose” is central to holacracy.  It provides the core 
principle around which all of this process turns.  Roles and circles are 
created, tensions are processed, and actions are justified all based on the 
central purpose of the organization and the subsidiary principles that flow 
therefrom.  The Holacracy Constitution specifies that the anchor circle of 
the organization is established in order “to express the overall Purpose of 
the Organization.”105 The purpose is described as “the deepest creative 
potential [the organization] can sustainably express in the world, given all 
of the constraints acting upon it and everything available to it.”106 In 
determining the purpose, the anchor circle is to look to the organization’s 
“history, current capacities, available resources, Partners, character, 
culture, business structure, brand, market awareness, and all other relevant 
resources or factors.”107 The anchor circle also has the authority to update 
the purpose as necessary, but if the anchor circle has a lead link, the lead 
link has the organization’s purpose within its accountabilities by default.108
The purpose-oriented organization is another facet of holacracy’s 
focus on structure and process rather than on people.  The organization 
exists above and apart from the people who populate it at any given time.  
As such, it must have an independent purpose that justifies its existence 
102 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 110 (“[The facilitator’s] responsibility is not to support 
or take care of the people; it is to protect the process, which itself allows people to take care of 
themselves.”).
103 LALOUX, supra note 6, at 68 (noting that the nurses “can’t offload these difficult 
decisions to a boss, and when things get tense, stressful, or unpleasant, there is no boss and no 
structure to blame”).
104 See Bernstein et al., supra note 6, at 43.
105 HOLACRACY CONST., art. V, § 2.
106 Id. § 2.3.
107 Id.
108 Id.
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and frames its actions.109 Holacracy does not seem to have any ulterior or 
metaphysical idea in mind.  Instead, the purpose is simply the concept that 
drives what the company does.  As Robertson notes, “[t]he purpose of a 
garbage disposal company might be simply ‘to create cleaner cities’—
which may not be glamorous, but nonetheless gets at the ‘why’ behind 
what the company does, and expresses a potential that the company is well 
suited to bring about in the world.”110 Holacracy expressly rejects the idea 
that the organization is simply the agglomeration of the personal 
aspirations of its participants; instead, the organization’s purpose must be 
found by its participants and must be followed in the organization’s 
activities.111
Once established, the purpose does seem to have organizational 
power over the participants.  Within the anchor circle, circle members 
must justify their decisions based on the organization’s purpose.  Unlike 
traditional corporations, where shareholder wealth maximization is 
generally the de facto and de jure corporate purpose, the holacratic 
organization looks to the purpose in order to justify transformational 
decisions like a merger, acquisition, or dissolution.112 And in the 
holacracy governance process, purpose plays a key role in structuring the 
dialogue within governance.  For example, an objection within the 
integrative decision-making process “needs to be related to a particular 
role the objector fills, and to describe how the proposal would diminish 
the role’s capacity to express its purpose or enact its accountabilities.”113
Purpose drives the conversations.  
Other self-managed or “teal” organizations also share this emphasis 
on purpose.  Described as “evolutionary purpose” by Laloux, these 
organizations orient around an idea, a goal, a direction, and then imbue the 
entire organization with that sense.114 Buurtzorg, for example, has a 
specific purpose: “to help sick and elderly patients live a more autonomous 
and meaningful life.”115 This purpose exists above and beyond the 
organization itself.  Buurtzorg thus sees other nursing organizations not as 
competitors, but rather as allies in the struggle to pursue this purpose.  
109 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 33 (“Said another way, what does this organization 
want to be in the world, and what does the world need this organization to be?”).  
110 Id.
111 Id. at 31–32; HOLACRACY CONST., art. I, § 1 (stating that a role has a purpose which 
is “a capacity, potential, or unrealizable goal that the Role will pursue or express on behalf of 
the Organization”).
112 Robertson Interview, supra note 33.
113 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 116.
114 LALOUX, supra note 6, at 56.
115 Id. at 195.  This purpose is not recorded in writing, but is spoken about frequently in 
order to keep it “alive” and prevent it from “becoming constraining.”  Id. at 201.
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Metrics like market share, growth, and profits are not important relative to 
the overall goal.  Buurtzorg’s tremendous growth may in fact be in 
furtherance of the purpose as it provides Buurtzorg’s innovative services 
to a broader group of patients.  But it is subsidiary to the organization’s 
overall purpose.  Purpose also drives strategy, at all levels of the 
organization: “people in these companies have a very clear, keen sense of 
the organization’s purpose and a broad sense of the direction the 
organization might be called to go.”116
Because the purpose is fluid, it may not be ensconced in the business 
organization’s charter or operating agreement with a great deal of 
specificity.  The Holacracy One, LLC, has a somewhat ambiguous purpose 
in its operating agreement:
Purposes of Company.  The Company was initially formed 
for the purpose, to the extent permitted by the Act, of 
discovering and clarifying the deepest creative potential the 
Organization is best-suited to sustainably express in the 
world, given all of the constraints operating upon it and 
everything available for its use in such expression, including 
its history, current capacities, available resources, Partners, 
character, culture, business structure, brand, market 
awareness, and all other resources or factors which may be 
relevant . . . .117
This passage is essentially a paraphrasing of the Holacracy Constitution’s 
definition of purpose rather than an actual and specific purpose.  Because 
this purpose is locked in through the operating agreement, the LLC has 
preserved its legal flexibility while arguably derogating the substantive 
nature of the holacracy purpose requirement.  
The primary purpose of the organization leads to the establishment 
of subsidiary circles, which each have their own subsidiary purposes 
within the overall purpose.118 When roles are established within these 
circles, each role must have a purpose along with a domain and an 
accountability.119 Although its domain defines the area of operation for a 
role, the role’s purpose is also important in justifying the actions within 
116 Id. at 207.
117 Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, § 2.4, at 7.
118 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 48 (“A circle is not a group of people, but a group of 
roles, and it is also, in a sense, a really big role itself, with a single cohesive purpose to express, 
some accountabilities to enact, and possibly some domains to control.”); HOLACRACY CONST., 
art. II, § 1 (“A ‘Circle’ is a Role that may further break itself down by defining its own contained 
Roles to achieve its Purpose, control its Domains, and enact its Accountabilities.”).
119 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 80.
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the role.120 These purposes are recorded within the governance record-
keeping system and can be referred to by the participants as they conduct 
the firm’s business.121
These three components—internal constitutional structure, complex 
governance processes, and evolutionary purpose—make up the core of the 
holacracy system.  They are also generally shared by other self-managed 
or “teal” organizations, but holacracy has a uniform and comprehensive 
approach that allows for more particularized study of these characteristics.  
To what extent are these differences meaningful under the law?  Do we 
need to think our traditional legal approaches to these firms?  The 
following Parts undertake an exploration of these questions.  
II. HOLACRACY AND ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY
The holacracy system of management changes the internal structure 
of business organizations from a command-and-control system to a 
devolved system of shared power.  But before turning to the effects of that 
change on the law of firm governance, it is important to recognize that 
holacracy changes the way we think about the organizations themselves.  
First, holacracy, and its use of the body as metaphor, provides a new 
perspective on the way we think about firms as entities or aggregates.  
Second, holacracy’s focus on organizational purpose challenges our 
diminished expectations for the role of purpose in corporations and other 
business entities.  These altered perspectives provide new insights about 
the roles of these organizations within our economy.
A. The Entity/Aggregate Debate
Ever since the law has allowed people to form organizations, the 
nature of these organizations has caused doctrinal and even metaphysical 
puzzles.122 Are organizations simply the sum of their parts—an 
aggregation of those who are involved in the enterprise—or is the 
organization itself an entity?123 And is this organization, when represented 
120 HOLACRACY CONST., art. I, § 3 (“As a Partner assigned to a Role, you have the 
authority to execute any Next-Actions you reasonably believe are useful for enacting your Role’s 
Purpose or Accountabilities.”).
121 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 153–54.
122 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 
999, 1000 (2010) (noting how the corporation evolved from its origins in Roman law).
123 Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business Through the Entity-Aggregate 
Prism, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 827 (2005) (discussing “whether the law envisages that 
form as an entity separate from its owners, rather than an aggregate of the several owners”).
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as a legally created association, an artificially created entity or a “real” 
entity in the social and legal sense?124 These questions have remained an 
open question within corporate law and business entity law more 
generally.125 Scholars have identified three separate theories of corporate 
personhood: the aggregate theory, the artificial entity theory, and the 
natural entity theory.126 Beyond the philosophical interest in such 
questions, they also may have an effect on corporate policy and doctrine.127
For example, those who argue for the artificial entity theory may use it to 
push for greater state regulation of the corporation, while those who argue 
in favor of the aggregate theory may advocate for fewer restrictions 
because the aggregation is voluntary.128
Holacracy’s approach adds a new layer to this debate by melding 
together all three theories in its perspective of the organization.  Rather 
than coming down on the side of entity or aggregate, holacracy supports a 
blended conception that uses the human body as a metaphor for the 
organization.129 While the body as a whole is one unit, it is supported by 
a variety of systems within systems that work together to ensure the 
functioning of the unit.  Each cell, for example, is “both a self-contained, 
whole entity and a part of a larger whole, an organ.”130 Similarly, each
organ is both a self-contained whole and also part of a whole.131 This 
metaphor, in and of itself, may seem fairly straightforward.  But holacracy 
takes the metaphor and uses to it to justify its devolution of power to 
individual teams of employees:
124 David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201 (1990) 
(discussing “the distinction between the corporation as an artificial creation of state law and the 
corporation as a natural product of private initiative”).
125 Kleinberger, supra note 123, at 830 (discussing the debate in the context of 
partnership).
126 Avi-Yonah, supra note 122, at 1001 (“Those theories are the aggregate theory, which 
views the corporation as an aggregate of its members or shareholders; the artificial entity theory, 
which views the corporation as a creature of the State; and the real entity theory, which views 
the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor an extension of the state, but as a separate 
entity controlled by its managers.”); Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm-
from Nature to Function, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 14 (2013) (discussing “the fiction, reality, or 
aggregate nature of corporations”).
127 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–
1960 66–67 (1992) (discussing the impact of an 1886 U.S. Supreme Court decision that a 
corporation was a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment).  But see Millon, supra note 124, 
at 202 (“Historically, the political implications of the natural/artificial and entity/aggregate 
distinctions have been ambiguous, meaning different things at different times.”).
128 Petrin, supra note 126, at 39 (“[C]ontractarians usually deny the firm's ability to bear 
social or moral duties and responsibilities based on its fictional character and, in addition, 
contend that shareholder interests are paramount.”).
129 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 17, 38.
130 Id. at 38.
131 Id.
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The rather miraculous human body functions efficiently and 
effectively not with a top-down command system but with a 
distributed system—a network of autonomous self-
organizing entities distributed throughout the body.  Each of 
these entities, which are your cells, organs, and organ 
systems, has capacity to take in messages, process them, and 
generate output.  Each has a function and has the autonomy 
to organize how it completes that function.132
If each cell, organ, or organ system had to be separately commanded by 
the brain, our systems would not work.  Holacracy carries this analysis 
through to its system of roles and circles.  Roles are similar to the 
individual cells while circles are like organs.  Each role and circle must 
have an independent set of functions while, at the same time, must 
recognize itself as part of an overall whole.133
I do not mean to make too much of holacracy’s use of analogy here; 
obviously, the analogy is not only a common one, but also an imperfect 
one.134 However, given the recent revival in the debate over the 
appropriate conception of the corporation, particularly at the Supreme 
Court,135 holacracy’s melding of theory and application does add usefully 
to the ongoing contemplations on the issue.  Neither the entity theory nor 
the aggregate theory completely captures the facets of organizational 
existence.  Instead, holacracy advocates for a system of entities within 
entities as the appropriate way to think through some of our larger 
questions of corporate identity.136 This approach also lends itself to a new 
way of thinking about corporate and organizational purpose.  
B. Organizational Purpose
Holacracy puts organizational purpose front and center.  Deriving 
the entity’s purpose is one of the first things to be done when the initial 
132 Id. at 17.
133 Id. at 47 (noting that “a circle that behaves as if it were fully autonomous will harm 
the system, just as a cell in the body that disregards the larger system becomes cancer”). 
134 Id. at 39 (noting the difference between human beings and cells).
135 Avi-Yonah, supra note 122, at 1033–45 (discussing entity theory in the context of 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)); Jason Iuliano, Do Corporations Have Religious 
Beliefs?, 90 IND. L.J. 47, 49 (2015) (discussing entity theory in the context of  Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)).
136 For a systems-theory approach to corporate law, see Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn A. 
Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
579 (2018).
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“anchor circle” is established.137 Certainly, having a set of goals, or a 
mission statement, or another statement of purpose is not unusual in 
Corporate America.138 But the holacracy focus on purpose is imbedded 
into the constitution and informs the company’s governance processes.  
Moreover, this purpose is mission-driven.  In that respect, a holacracy-
derived purpose differs markedly from the de facto and de jure purpose of 
for-profit corporations: to maximize the wealth of shareholders.  Thus, the 
primary questions for the law will be: to what extent does an 
organizational purpose, when achieved through holacracy, have legal 
meaning, and, to what extent can it override the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm?  
In the earlier days of our republic, the law required corporations to 
establish a specific purpose as part of the incorporation process.139 The 
purpose specified the nature of the business to be established and provided 
a sense of scope.  This purpose was not merely hortatory—it established 
the boundaries of activities for participants within the firm.140 It could be 
seen as jurisdictional in nature: the corporation could not operate outside 
of the markers of its delineated activity.  This limitation was justified by 
the power that the state had provided to the corporation to exist in the first 
place.  The first corporations could only be formed for a limited set of
prescribed purposes, such a starting a university or building a canal.141 But 
as the scope of potential business purposes widened, the need for a specific 
purpose remained; an unlimited corporation could, theoretically, seek 
unlimited power.142 Therefore, corporations needed to specify their 
purpose as part of their chartering documents.143 The purpose requirement 
was enforced through an ultra vires, or “beyond the powers,” legal action.  
137 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 153.
138 Id. at 31.
139 Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 554–55 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“At first, 
corporations could be formed under the general laws only for a limited number of purposes . . . 
.”).
140 JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 60 (Arno Press Inc. 1972) (“[T]he general powers of a corporate 
body must be restricted by the nature and object of its institution.”).
141 Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: 
Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1145 (2012) (noting that “colleges, guilds, 
and municipalities were often organized as corporations, as were such public-serving 
transportation ventures as canals or turnpikes”).
142 Cf. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 554–55 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Limitations upon the 
scope of a business corporation's powers and activity were also long universal . . . .  The powers 
which the corporation might exercise in carrying out its purposes were sparingly conferred and 
strictly construed.”).
143 Edward H. Warren, Executory Ultra Vires Transactions, 24 HARV. L. REV. 534, 
534–35 (1911) (“But American legislatures in granting the corporate privilege, either by special 
charter or pursuant to the provisions of a general law, always have been, and still are, accustomed 
to incorporate any given body of associates for some, and not for all, purposes.”).
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Under this doctrine, shareholders could sue the corporation if it went 
beyond the scope of its purpose, as established in the charter.144 Because 
it limited the reach of corporate power to enumerated purposes, the ultra 
vires doctrine was “an important tool to protect the state's interest in 
restricting the power and size of corporations and to protect the 
shareholders from managerial overreaching.”145 Cases typically involved 
a corporation purchasing another company that was outside of the firm’s 
specified scope or carrying on business in violation of its charter.146 In 
some cases, contracts were rendered void if the one party knew that the 
other party was acting ultra vires.147 This led to the odd situation of 
corporations seeking to escape obligations on the grounds that they had 
exceeded their powers.148
As corporations became more commonplace and less attention was 
paid to the specific charters, the ultra vires doctrine began to break down.  
Other doctrines came to occupy the same regulatory space: antitrust 
provided a better tool for preventing corporate overreaching and 
monopoly while shareholders brought derivative suits to enforce director 
and officer fiduciary duties.149 Ultra vires prohibitions remain on the 
144 Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, A Prod, and A Big Stick: An 
Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as Methods 
for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 929, 930 (2005) (“The ultra vires 
doctrine historically allowed a shareholder to sue to prevent a company from engaging in an 
activity outside of the specific parameters of its corporate charter.”).
145 Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality 
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV.
1279, 1302 (2001).
146 See id.
147 Recent Cases, Corporations - Ultra Vires - Continuing Contract Made for an 
Unauthorized Purpose, 27 HARV. L. REV. 680, 680 (1914) (finding a contract for the sale of 
coal to a railroad for resale was void if the seller was chargeable with knowledge of the railroad's 
unlawful purpose—namely, to resell the coal outside of its scope as a common carrier).
148 Cf. Colo. Springs Co. v. Am. Pub. Co., 97 F. 843, 849 (8th Cir. 1899) (“The question 
concerning its power to execute the contracts is not raised by the state, but by the corporation 
itself, to avoid a liability to another corporation with which it has contracted; and for these 
reasons a more liberal view may be taken of its implied powers than could otherwise be 
entertained.”).  Because of the potential for abuses under this approach, courts began to rein in 
the doctrine.  See Editorial, Ultra Vires Contracts in the Federal Courts, 19 HARV. L. REV. 608, 
609 (1906) (“In consequence there has been generally adopted a working rule lying half way 
between the two above suggested, and making an ultra vires contract neither quite void nor 
voidable by any particular party, nor yet quite good; but a thing which is a type unto itself, —
bad unless there is some reason of justice or expediency to the contrary.  Thus a wholly executory 
ultra vires contract is treated as if illegal, but if one side has performed, so that such treatment 
would cause hardship, a remedy is given.”).
149 Prior to the New Deal securities acts, shareholders were still in a position to bring 
contract claims against officers if the corporation exceeded its purpose.  Charles E. Carpenter, 
Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded?, 33 YALE L.J. 49, 65 (1923) (“If the officers 
2018 HOLACRACY AND THE LAW 25
books in almost every state.150 Consequently, corporations learned to have 
as broad a corporate purpose as possible.151 Today, even though 
corporations are allowed to have specific purposes, for-profit companies 
generally follow specific language: the corporation is formed to conduct 
and transact all lawful business activities allowed under the laws of the 
state.152
At around the same time as ultra vires actions were disappearing, 
the notion of shareholder primacy was beginning to take hold.  Two 
influential works on this score—one a case, the other a book—emerged to 
frame the debate.  Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (“Dodge”),153 emphasized the 
responsibility of management to run the company in the interests of the 
shareholders.154 Through the shareholder action, the minority 
shareholders were able to force the controlling shareholder to provide a 
substantial dividend.155 (The plaintiffs had also brought a claim of ultra 
vires, but it was dismissed by the court.156)  The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property provided a structural theory of shareholder rights in the 
face of management opportunism.157 These two sources both represented 
the idea of shareholder primacy—the idea that the corporation is to be run 
of the corporation enter into an ultra vires contract without the assent of the stockholder they 
violate his contract. For this he has his remedy. He may sue the officers for breach of contract.”).
150 Sulkowsi & Greenfield, supra note 144, at 945 (“The incorporation statutes of forty-
nine states allow these states to dissolve a corporation or enjoin it from engaging in ultra 
vires activities--that is, activities outside of the corporation's authority.”).
151 See, e.g., Recent Cases, Corporations - Ultra Vires: What Acts Are Ultra Vires - Ill-
Defined Objects of Incorporation, 32 HARV. L. REV. 285, 290 (1919) (discussing a corporate 
purpose “enabling the company to carry on almost every conceivable kind of business which 
such an organization could adopt”).
152 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held 
U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 618 (2017) (“[F]or-profit corporations, 
including social enterprises organized as corporations, usually take advantage of the full breadth 
of the permitted purposes for which a corporation can be organized and operated under the 
applicable state law.”).  For an example of this language, see MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
FAQs, http://www.sos.mo.gov/business/faqs.asp (citing a “general purpose” which states that 
“[t]he corporation is formed to conduct and transact all lawful business activities allowed under 
the laws of the State of Missouri”) (last visited May 3, 2018).
153 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
154 Id. at 684 (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders.  The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.  The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end and does not 
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the nondistribution of profits 
among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.”); Gordon Smith, The 
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 322 (1998) (persuasively arguing that Dodge is 
actually about horizontal equity—the need to run the business in the interest of all shareholders 
and not just the controlling ones).
155 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 685.
156 Id. at 681.
157 ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 1, 380 (Transaction Publishers rev. ed. 1932).
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in the financial interest of the shareholders.  As corporations were 
dropping specific purposes from their charters, the shareholder primacy 
norm was stepping in to provide a purpose in its place.  The norm was 
supercharged in the 1970s with the push to increase shareholder returns 
through hostile takeovers and private equity acquisitions.  The nascent law 
and economics movement provided intellectual ballast to the changing 
economic and financial norms.  For the last fifteen to twenty years, if not 
more, the shareholder wealth maximization norm has dominated both 
boardrooms and the academic literature.158
The importance of the shareholder primacy norm lies not only in its 
cultural sway.  The norm also has the force of law.  As the Dodge language 
first made clear, shareholders have the legal right to expect that the 
corporation will be run in their interest. Certainly, the business judgment 
rule provides a significant zone of activity within which the corporation 
can make decisions concerning its everyday business.  But the norm has 
legal force in many states—Delaware being the most prominent.  The 
recent words of then-Chancellor Chandler make the point plainly: “Having 
chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the 
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards 
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders.”159
Holacracy and shareholder primacy are, at best, uneasy bedfellows.  
The holacracy governance structure can fit within an otherwise 
traditionally structured corporation; the board of directors can retain all of 
its traditional powers but create a holacracy beneath it.160 However, 
holacracy’s focus on purpose elevates the organization’s needs above the 
needs of the shareholders and replaces shareholder primacy with what 
might (clumsily) be called “purpose-primacy.”  As described in 
Holacracy:
However you choose to populate your board, Holacracy also 
reframes the purpose of the board’s stewardship of the 
organization.  With Holacracy adopted at a board level, the 
board does not exist to steward the company for the sake of 
its shareholders, or even for the sake of all of its stakeholders, 
158 Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
2003, 2004 (2013) (“Many, and possibly most, public companies now embrace a shareholder-
centered vision of good corporate governance that emphasizes ‘maximizing shareholder value’ 
(typically measured by share price) over all other corporate goals.”).
159 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
160 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 163–64.  For further discussion of structural issues, see 
infra Part III.
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but rather to steward it for the organization itself—in other 
words, for expressing the organization’s purpose.  
Interestingly, this makes the distinction between for-profit
and nonprofit less relevant.  Organizations running with 
Holacracy are first and foremost purpose-driven, regardless 
of their tax structure, with all activities ultimately being for 
the sake of realizing the organization’s broader purpose.161
A holacracy-governed organization would not follow the shareholder 
primacy norm.  Instead, it would focus on the organization’s purpose, as 
derived through the holacracy process.  
The holacracy literature is somewhat vague on the role of 
shareholders within the organization, as that literature offers a “broad tent” 
approach to encourage widespread adoption.162 At the same time, a true 
holacracy would reject shareholder primacy as the governing norm.  
Holacracy-governed corporations could potentially present the next wave 
of challenges to Delaware’s recent confirmation of the primacy norm.  In 
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,163 the Court of Chancery 
rescinded the directors’ adoption of a shareholder rights plan that restricted 
minority shareholders’ ability to purchase shares and to freely sell shares 
as well as their effort to obtain a right of first refusal for the corporation 
over the shares held by minority shareholders.164 However, if a holacratic 
corporation took similar steps, would its adoption of holacracy be 
sufficient to put shareholders on notice that it would not follow the 
shareholder primacy norm?  Could a holacratic corporation opt out of the 
Revlon rule?165 To some extent, the question is whether shareholder 
primacy is a default rule, and if it is, whether the choice of holacracy is 
161 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 166.
162 Id. at 163.
163 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010)
164 Id. at 34–35.
165 The Revlon rule regards a company’s ability to either sell the company or otherwise 
divest complete control of the company; further, under Revlon, the board must seek to secure 
the highest possible bid once it has committed to selling. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).  For an expansion on the Revlon rule, see 
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 39, at 406 (“Once a Revlon auction begins, it no longer matters whether 
benefiting nonshareholder interests may also benefit shareholders.  Instead, shareholder wealth 
maximization is the board’s only appropriate concern.”) (quoting Revlon., 506 A.2d at 182). 
Further, Delaware courts have not permitted corporations to waive the Revlon duties 
prospectively. For an opposing viewpoint, see David Jackson & Joseph B. Frumkin, The Global 
Role of Corporate Law, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 106, 119 (2000) (asking whether “the Delaware 
legislature, with the recommendation of the Delaware Bar, [might] be prepared to say that if you 
duly incorporate with a U.K. company, [you could] opt out in your charter from Revlon and 
Unocal, for example, and defer to the semi-private takeover board regulation which works in 
England”).
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sufficient to opt out of it.  But if shareholder primacy is a mandatory rule 
within Delaware, the choice of business organization becomes more 
important for holacracy-interested firms.  
C. Choice of Organizational Form
The corporation is the most common form of business organization 
in the United States today.166 However, there is an underappreciated 
variety of different business association types that are available to 
businesses: partnerships, limited partnerships (LPs), limited liability 
partnerships (LLPs), limited liability companies (LLCs), and—newest on 
the scene—the benefit corporation.  Because of its unique take on the 
nature of the holacratic business entity as well as the focus on a broader 
purpose, holacratic firms may wish to explore alternative legal models for 
the formation and continuing governance of their firms.  
The benefit corporation may, in fact, seem tailor-made for 
holacracy.167 The signal change from corporation to benefit corporation is 
its rejection of the shareholder primacy norm for a more socially-
beneficial corporate purpose.  This purpose must fit within the rubric of 
“social benefit” as defined by the state statute.  Although most states 
provide a relatively broad definition,168 the benefit corporation restrains 
itself by opting for a purpose that can then be used as a metric.  State 
benefit corporation law usually includes some mechanisms for enforcing 
the “benefit” component, such as benefit reporting, a benefit officer, 
166 Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and Corporate Structure, 45 STETSON L. REV. 
69, 71 (2015) (“Although a variety of different business organizational forms exist, such as the 
partnership, the limited liability company (LLC), and the sole proprietorship, the corporation 
clearly dominates the economic landscape.”).
167 See Matthew J. Dulac, Sustaining the Sustainable Corporation: Benefit Corporations 
and the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L.J. 171, 175 (2015) (“A benefit corporation is a 
for-profit corporation with a stated public benefit that operates in a responsible and sustainable 
manner; in other words, it pursues the dual mission of making a profit and achieving some social 
good.”).  Benefit corporations (sometimes called B corps) are a form of business organization 
created by state statutes to promote a more socially-responsible orientation within the business.  
See Brett McDonnell, Benefit Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (The Existential 
Failing of Delaware), 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 280 (2016) (“State statutes legally define 
benefit corporations. These statutes sit atop the basic business corporation statute. That is, 
benefit corporations are business corporations, subject to all of the rules of the business 
corporation statute, except insofar as the benefit corporation statute provides different or 
additional rules.”).
168 Delaware defines public benefit, as “a positive effect (or reduction of negative 
effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other than 
stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited to, effects of an 
artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious, 
scientific or technological nature.”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2016).
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fiduciary duties related to the benefit, or ultra vires actions if the purpose 
is ignored.  This new model might seem to match up well with the more 
socially-oriented framework of holacracy.  
However, holacracy has not embraced the benefit corporation 
model.  When holacracy talks of purpose, it does not specifically designate 
a “socially beneficial” purpose to the organization.  Because it seeks 
widespread adoption as a governance method for firms of all shapes, sizes, 
and economic motives, holacracy does not want to be pigeonholed in the 
“green” or “good” economic space.  Certainly, other integral or “teal” 
organizations may naturally gravitate towards a higher aim; Buurtzorg, for 
example, seeks to “help sick and elderly patients live a more autonomous 
and meaningful life.”169 But these organizations may simply seek to better 
serve their customers; that idea, specified and framed as a purpose, is 
sufficient for holacracy.  Moreover, for a company already grappling with 
the complexity of holacracy, adding in the new benefit corporation 
requirements may be piling too much on.  It is even uncertain to what 
extent benefit corporations may escape from the shareholder primacy 
norm itself.170
Holacracy One, LLC—as its name makes clear—opted to form as a 
limited liability company.171 It has included a purpose in its operating 
agreement, but a beneficial purpose is not required for LLCs, and 
Holacracy One’s purpose is actually fairly vague.172 Other than the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing towards the LLC members, the operating
agreement expressly endeavors to exclude fiduciary duties owed by the 
firm managers to the extent allowed under law.173 There is no specific 
mechanism for enforcing the company’s purpose.  The operating 
agreement does have an arbitration clause providing “final, binding and 
non-appealable arbitration” for disputes that arise within the agreement.174
Holacracy’s emphasis on organizational purpose, as discussed in 
Part II.B. above, appears to be a jarring contrast with Holacracy One’s 
vague and unenforceable statement of purpose.  But I think the latter 
primarily reflects an effort to keep governance within the holacracy 
governance process and outside of the courts.  This may seem of a piece 
with the familiar managerialism that is commonplace in all types of firms.  
But the holacracy movement is intent on creating its own private form of 
169 LALOUX, supra note 6, at 195.  This purpose is not recorded in writing, but is spoken 
about frequently in order to keep it “alive” and prevent it from “becoming constraining.”  Id. at 
201.
170 Heminway, supra note 152, at 632–33.
171 Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, Preamble, at 1.
172 Id. § 2.4, at 7.
173 Id. § 3.5, at 9.
174 Id. § 17.8, at 37.
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governance.  To some extent, litigating over internal matters is opting out 
of the holacracy process, and holacracy is all about that internal process.  
In that respect, Holacracy One is an example of the organizational 
flexibility that commentators, such as Larry Ribstein175 and Justin 
Blount176 have touted in their writings.  Although both Ribstein and Blount 
preferred shareholder primacy as a normative matter, they argued that the 
organizational tools existed to pursue other models of governance within 
business organizations.  Holacracy One took the freedom to escape from 
shareholder primacy and, in its place, only inserted an unenforceable 
placeholder.  But if participants want legal rights as to the firm’s purpose, 
the public benefit corporation is developing those enforcement 
mechanisms.  The success of benefit corporations, as opposed to LLCs or 
other vehicles, may show us whether the “market” for integrated 
organizations wants a legally-enforceable social benefit purpose—or just 
an internally enforced one.  
For the rest of this article, however, we will primarily assume that 
the holacratic organization in question is a corporation.  Although 
partnerships, LLPs, and LLCs have their advantages, it is more difficult to 
build a large-scale, publicly-financed business entity without the corporate 
frame.177 LLCs may make the most sense for smaller, closely-held 
businesses like Holacracy One.178 But corporations remain the 
organization of choice for larger, publicly-traded entities—the kind that 
drive most of our economy.  Moreover, holacracy has significant effects 
on our traditional notions of corporate structure within the corporate form.  
It is to these changes in firm governance that we now turn.  
III. HOLACRACY AND FIRM MANAGEMENT
Holacracy’s claim to fame is its upending of the traditional 
corporate hierarchy and its installation of a constitutional system of team 
governance.  It is a radical departure from existing managerial norms and 
175 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 1, 14 (New York, Oxford 
University Press 2010).
176 Blount has argued that “it is clearly the case that existing corporate law allows for 
the creation of corporate entities in which multiple stakeholders have a formal role in 
governance.” Justin Blount, Creating A Stakeholder Democracy Under Existing Corporate Law, 
18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 365, 368 (2016).
177 See RIBSTEIN, supra note 175, at 153, 179–82 (discussing the limitations of LLCs, 
including the binary choice of manager- and member-management, restrictions on the 
transferability of management rights, and the lack of a default right to disassociate).
178 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS 
ENTITIES 417 (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2009) (“Acceptance of the LLC has grown to the extent that 
it is now the dominant business form for closely held firms.”).
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would dramatically change workplace culture.  But what does holacracy 
mean for the law of firm management?  Would we have to think differently 
about the legal rights and responsibilities of those who run our companies?  
A. The Board of Directors
Most businesses with significant numbers of employees are 
structured as corporations.179 Corporations are creatures of state law: 
fictional entities that entitle the participants to certain rights.  The 
corporation is formed through a corporate charter or articles of 
incorporation.180 Although states may not technically require a board of 
directors,181 the board is an almost universal feature.182 The directors 
manage the firm and may bind the corporation through contracts and 
transfers of property.183 Shareholders select the directors at the annual 
shareholders meeting.184 Directors are bound to act in the interests of the 
firm through common law fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and loyalty.  
However, the directors delegate the actual job of running the business to 
the officers, primarily through a hierarchy headed by the CEO.185 This 
structure provides the basics of corporate law: shareholders select the 
directors, who in turn select the officers to run the corporation.  
The default rule for holacracy is to leave this structure in place.186
The holacratic process is about internal firm management, not capital 
structure.  This decision is likely, in part, strategic: it is much easier to get 
a CEO to adopt holacracy as a managerial philosophy and practice rather 
than for the board to commit to holacracy on behalf of the entire 
organization.  If adopted by the firm’s management or even by the board 
on behalf of the firm’s management (leaving the board in place), there is 
179 See Andrew Lundeen & Kyle Pomerleau, Corporations Make up 5 Percent of 
Businesses but Earn 62 Percent of Revenues, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 25, 2014), 
https://tinyurl.com/yaaue3xx (sixty-two percent of organizational tax revenues come from 
corporations); see also RIBSTEIN, supra note 175, at 4 (“The corporation undeniably has driven 
business growth in the United States since the Industrial Revolution.”).
180 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (2016).
181 See, e.g., id. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under 
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”). 
182 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2010).
183 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2016).
184 Id. § 211.
185 See, e.g., id. § 142(a) (“Every corporation organized under this chapter shall have 
such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the 
board of directors which is not inconsistent with the bylaws.”).
186 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 151 (suggesting that beginning holacracy adopters use 
a CEO policy, rather than board-level action, “to avoid the extra complexity of getting board-
level buy-in up front”).
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relatively little effect on the board.187 As a next step, the board could retain 
its role within the company but implement holacracy at the board level.  
This change would reorient the board as the anchor circle, with the General 
Company circle as the only sub-circle.188 The board’s lead link to the 
General Company circle would be akin to the CEO, without the CEO’s 
usual authority to circumvent internal governance processes.  There would 
be no lead link at the board level, and the board would have a fairly similar 
structure.  However, it would use the holacracy governance processes to 
raise tensions and pursue solutions through an integrative decision-making 
process.189 Ultimately, the biggest change would be in the process and not 
in the structure.  
A further extension of the holacracy approach would be a change 
more in the spirit of holacracy than its letter.  As one twist on a holacracy-
centered board, Robertson suggests the possibility of a multi-stakeholder 
board constructed through holacracy.190 Such a structure would be too 
messy, he suggests, for a conventional board.191 But he argues that 
stakeholders would be better able to coexist on the board following the 
holacracy rules and integrative governance process.192 Robertson 
acknowledges that he cannot speak from authority about such an approach, 
but finds it “an intriguing possibility.”193
The law presumes that shareholders, rather than stakeholders, elect 
the board of directors.194 However, there are a variety of ways in which a 
corporation could create a multi-stakeholder board.  For example, in the 
articles of incorporation or in the bylaws, the board and/or the shareholders 
could install certain director qualifications, such as the requirement that 
one director shall be drawn from the ranks of a certain group of employees 
187 One important issue would be whether the board could bind itself to employ a 
holacratic management structure.  As the model holacracy constitution permits holacracy to be 
undone the same way in which it was implemented, the board would have the same power to 
revoke.  HOLACRACY CONST. art. V, § 5.  A board could explore amending the corporation’s 
charter or bylaws to require holacracy, but those actions could then be undone through the same 
amendment process. 
188 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 163.
189 Id. at 163–64.
190 Id. at 164–65.
191 Id. at 165 (positing that “a multi-stakeholder board in a conventional board power 
structure could easily devolve into a deadlock or a ‘tyranny of the majority’”).
192 Id. at 166.
193 Id. at 165.
194 See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.1.1, at 94 (1986) (“Shareholders 
vote to elect the directors and to approve extraordinary matters like mergers, sale of all assets, 
dissolutions, and amendments of the articles of incorporation.”).
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or from the leadership of a certain set of environmental groups.195
Shareholders would still elect the directors, but those directors would have 
to be drawn from certain pools.  A more direct method would assign shares 
of various classifications to various stakeholders, making them 
“shareholders” even if they did not contribute capital.196 These structures 
would be more complicated but are permissible under state law.197 Of 
course, these structures would dilute the equity shareholders claims, to a 
greater or lesser extent, and would be objectionable to those equity holders 
on that basis.198 Moreover, for public companies of a certain size, federal 
regulations and stock exchange listing requirement involve further 
complications.199 But such structures would certainly be available to 
smaller and start-up firms, and it makes sense that the holacracy movement 
sees allies in the corporate social responsibility and stakeholder 
movements.  
Holacracy-centered boards would also have to accommodate other 
legal requirements regarding composition and structure.  The major stock 
exchanges require that a majority of directors be independent of 
management and define that independence as requiring the absence of 
financial interests that would cut against the director’s primary 
responsibilities as director.200 Under stock exchange rules, boards must 
also have certain committees, such as audit, nominating, and 
compensation committees, with particularized composition (as to 
independence) and detailed responsibilities.201 Holacracy would have 
something to say about the internal governance processes within the 
committees and might label them as “sub-circles” within the board’s 
anchor circle.  The board might also need to incorporate certain procedural 
protections to ensure that these committees, particularly the audit 
committees, retain certain metrics of independence, power, and 
195 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2016); Blount, supra note 176, at 383–85 
(discussing this avenue).
196 Blount, supra note 176, at 385–93.
197 For an example of a corporation that classified shares to allow a director to be elected 
with a $10 capital stake, see Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 803 (Del. 1966).
198 Blount, supra note 176, at 386.
199 Id. at 393–400.  The most difficult obstacles would likely be “voting rights” policies 
by NYSE and NASDAQ that prevent disparate restrictions or reductions in the rights of common 
equity shareholders.  Id. at 395–97 (citing NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NYSE LISTED 
COMPANY MANUAL § 313.00 (2015), https://perma.cc/SF39-SF4J [hereinafter NYSE
MANUAL]; NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, NASDAQ LISTING RULES §§ 5600–40 (2015), 
perma.cc/VJS6-RDLC).
200 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 39, at 80–83 (citing NYSE MANUAL §§ 303A.01, 303A.02, 
303A.03).
201 Id. at 84–89 (citing NYSE MANUAL §§ 303A.04,303A.05, 303A.06).
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authority.202 Of course, holacracy’s modus operandi is to devolve power 
to accountable bodies, so these structural mechanisms would likely 
reinforce, rather than contradict, the stock exchange independence 
requirements.  But these specific requirements would need to be followed.  
Finally, holacracy could change the nature—or, at least, seek to 
change the nature—of the fiduciary duties that the board owes to the 
corporation.  The traditional fiduciary duties are those of care and loyalty 
towards the firm.  The duty of care is substantially mitigated by the 
business judgment rule, which provides directors with substantial freedom 
from review of the reasonableness of their actions.203 Moreover, there is 
no reason to think that holacracy would change the directors’ basic duties 
of care.  Nor would holacracy impact the duty of loyalty, to the extent it 
requires directors to place the interests of the company above their own 
personal interests.204 As discussed earlier, holacracy would in fact 
dramatically change the existing presumption of shareholder wealth 
maximization, which may then alter the board’s approach to certain 
questions, such as the sale of substantially all assets through an auction.205
However, for those extraordinary decisions, holacracy may in fact 
prioritize the needs of equity holders.  To the extent that the board’s 
stakeholder orientation would seek to change responsibilities such as 
Revlon duties,206 those changes would stand apart from the requirements 
of holacracy itself.  
B. Officers
Holacracy does not require change to the superstructure of the firm, 
at least in composition.  A holacratic corporation could still have a board 
of directors, and that board could still operate as a traditional board.  
However, the nature of the CEO’s position, as well as the other subsidiary 
officers, would change dramatically under holacracy.  Holacracy is a 
system of defined powers and responsibilities.  Rather than a monarchy in 
which one person’s decisions control the rest of the organization, 
holacracy establishes domains of authority throughout the organization 
and governance processes that enable a group of people to decide policy.  
202 See, e.g., NYSE MANUAL § 303A.07 (listing audit committee requirements such as 
a written charter, an annual report, a set of confidential, anonymous reporting whistleblowing 
procedures, and the power to retain independent counsel). 
203 See CLARK, supra note 194, § 3.4, at 123.
204 See id. § 4.1, at 141.
205 See supra Part II.B.
206 For a discussion of Revlon duties, see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 39, at 405–06.
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Rather than holding power at the whim of the CEO, holacracy participants 
hold the power that the governance structure has provided.207 It is a “shift 
from personal leadership to constitutionally derived power.”208
On a day-to-day level, this change in organizational structure has a 
dramatic effect on the CEO position.  Authority and responsibility are 
taken off the CEO’s shoulders and distributed to the other organizational 
players.  Robertson describes the “tremendous relief” that most CEOs feel 
after a shift to holacracy.209 Should this shift in power also mean a shift in 
the legal accoutrements of the position?  In other words, perhaps the 
holacracy CEO—and other corporate officers—should no longer be 
considered “officers” under the law.  
Compared to directors, whose role and function are specified clearly 
under statute, the role of officers within corporate law is less settled.210
Under Delaware law, officers are creatures of a corporation’s bylaws or 
board resolution.211 Thus, it may seem that the firm’s officers are 
whomever the corporation designates as such.212 However, there is also 
the sense that officers should have some underlying definition that is 
consistent across corporations.  We see this consistency with various titles: 
the CEO is the top of the hierarchy; the chief operating officer is the 
second-in-command and in charge of general operations; and the chief 
financial officer is primarily responsible for finances and financial risk.  
Indeed, a mark of status for a particular business field is to have a “chief 
officer” in the subject area, such as “chief information officer” or “chief 
privacy officer.”213 However, “officer” is not statutorily defined, and 
courts have arrived at different definitions of the term for different 
purposes.214 One definition from two well-regarded commentators—one 
207 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 26 (“Holacracy thus takes some of the organizational 
design functions that traditionally reside with a CEO or executive team and place them into 
processes that are enacted throughout the organization, with everyone’s participation.”).
208 Id. at 22.
209 Id. at 23.
210 DeMott, supra note 3, at 848.
211 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2016).
212 See, e.g., In re Brocade Commc'ns Sys., Inc. Derivative Litig., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 
1049 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Brocade's bylaws define ‘officers’ to include ‘one or more Vice 
Presidents, and such other Officers that will be appointed by the Board of Directors.’ Jensen, as 
the Vice President of HR, was therefore an officer of the Company and did owe it fiduciary 
duties.”).
213 For sense of the relative fortunes of these two positions, see Thomas H. Davenport, 
Why No One Wants to Be a Chief Information Officer Any More, FORTUNE (Mar. 10, 2016), 
https://tinyurl.com/jshbqak; Sarah K. White, 5 Reasons You Need to Hire a Chief Privacy 
Officer, CIO (Feb. 1, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y9adx5ge. 
214 Verity Winship, Jurisdiction over Corporate Officers and the Incoherence of Implied 
Consent, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1171, 1195–96 (2013) (“While directors are usually easily 
identified, the definition of officer is more fluid, and may vary by corporation or by area of the 
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of the few definitions available in the literature—is that: “[t]he term 
‘officer’ is properly applicable only to those in whom administrative and 
executive functions have been entrusted, and does not apply to those 
without judgment or discretion as to corporate matters.”215 But this 
definition seems significantly overbroad, as it would essentially apply to 
all of a firm’s administrative and executive employees that have some 
degree of discretion.  Another definition describes officers as “executives, 
tasked with making decisions about the running of the company.”216 This 
definition comes closer, in my view, but in some ways merely replaces 
“officers” with “executives.”217
Under holacracy, traditional officer positions would be eliminated 
in favor of particularized “roles.”  These roles are created within the 
governance structure to address needs within the company.  There are four 
holacracy-related links (lead link, rep link, facilitator, and secretary), but 
otherwise the links are generated and eliminated as necessary.  As 
discussed in Part I, the lead link for the anchor circle is the closest 
holacracy comes to a CEO.  But the lead link for the anchor circle is 
certainly not the same as the CEO.  Through holacracy, the CEO hands 
over her absolute authority within the corporation to the holacracy 
process.218 The power of any particular individual, including a lead link, 
is based entirely on the set of roles that the person has.  Robertson, for 
example, is akin to the CEO of Holacracy One, LLC, but his position 
within the company is based on his role as anchor circle lead link along 
with over thirty other roles that he serves.219 And roles are different than 
positions or titles; while people have a particular title; roles are different 
than the people who hold them.220 The role exists whether or not a 
particular person fills it, and people take on or shed roles within their 
working life with much more fluidity.221
law. ‘Officer’ means one thing for personal jurisdiction, another for securities disclosure rules, 
and who-knows-what for triggering state-law fiduciary duties.”).
215 A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-
Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 216 (1992) (citing Lethem v. Wilson, 185 A. 
642, 643 (Pa. 1936); Colonial Capital Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 29 F.R.D. 514, 517 (D. Conn. 
1961)).
216 John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 65 (2014).
217 See supra Part I.B 1 & 2.
218 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 151.
219 Brian Robertson, GLASS FROG, https://app.glassfrog.com/people/47 (listing the 
“accountabilities” for each of the roles). 
220 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 43 (“Holacracy focuses on clearly differentiating 
individuals from the roles they fill.”).
221 Id. at 43–45.
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Holacracy’s lack of officers—or, more precisely, the diffusion of 
officer responsibilities into governance processes and roles—further 
clouds the already murky waters around officers’ fiduciary duties.  Such 
duties were not established clearly under Delaware law as recently as a 
decade ago—but now have been explicitly endorsed.222 However, the 
nature of those duties remains ambiguous.  Delaware case law declares the 
officers’ duties to be “identical” to directors’ duties.223 However, officers 
serve the corporation much more directly and have more day-to-day power 
over the operations.  The Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”) 
defines officers as employees—which they generally would seem to be.224
Because employees are considered to be agents, they would owe a 
different set of additional duties that agents owe to their principals—and 
employees owe to their employers.225 Deborah DeMott has advocated for 
a much more rigorous set of fiduciary duties based on officers’ unique 
roles as high-ranking employees.226 She argues that the duties of loyalty, 
care, competence, diligence, and obedience are inherent in the underlying 
relationship between officer and corporation.227 In particular, she singles 
out the specific agency duty requiring agents to adhere to the instructions 
provided by their principals.228 Moreover, DeMott rejects the application 
of the business judgment rule to officers as the rule is typically applied 
only to corporate directors and not to other agents.229
With holacracy radically redistributing power and authority within 
the organization, fiduciary obligations would likely change.  The most 
straightforward option would allocate duties according to title and find that 
none of the non-officerial workers are fiduciaries.  This would arguably 
follow Delaware law, which has tended to place a premium on the use of 
“officer” nomenclature to designate actual officers.  However, Delaware 
and other states might blanch at the idea of an officer-less organization.  
Another potential tack would be to follow the authority “downwards” as 
it is reallocated to other various roles.  The lead link of the anchor circle 
would likely be a fiduciary as that lead link role would have control over 
filling roles in the general company circle and would serve as the direct 
222 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (holding explicitly that 
“officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and 
that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors”).
223 Id. at 708.
224 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40(8).
225 See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are 
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2005) (making the case that “corporate 
officers are fiduciaries because they are agents”).
226 DeMott, supra note 3, at 859–62.
227 Id. at 859–60.
228 Id. at 859–62.
229 Id. at 866–70
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liaison to the board.  However, below that level, it might be difficult for 
any one person to accumulate a set of roles that approximate the authority 
that officers have in a hierarchical system.  Alternatively, courts could 
interpret holacracy to mean that all workers have greater fiduciary 
responsibilities to the firm because more authority has been devolved to 
them.  After all, one of the key tenets of holacracy is the allocation of 
significant discretion over decision-making to a wider array of firm 
participants.230 This may lead to holacracy “officers” being treated as 
ordinary employees.231 Ultimately, because holacracy represents such a 
deviation from the standard norms of firm hierarchy and organization, 
courts may lean more heavily on the holacracy “contract” to determine the 
parties’ reasonable expectations.232 The constitution may be seen as a 
form of “lawful instructions” to the workers, especially if adopted through 
a board resolution.  Rather than differentiating between officers and other 
employees or agents, courts may adopt more of a case-by-case, spectrum 
approach to determining the appropriate level of fiduciary duty owed by a 
particular worker or role to the organization.  
IV. HOLACRACY AND WORKPLACE LAW
A. Workers as Employees
Like many aspects of organization law, workplace law has also been 
built on the assumption of the existence of a hierarchical relationship 
within the firm.  The assumption of a hierarchy begins with the very 
definition of employment itself.  Under the traditional common law, 
employees—called “servants”—were defined by their relationship with 
their “masters.”  The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines a servant as 
“an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose 
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is 
subject to the right to control by the master.”233 The right to control means 
“being entitled to tell the servant when to work (within the hours of 
230 Cf. LALOUX, supra note 6, at 113 (noting that all Morning Star employees can 
purchase on behalf of the company, provided that they have sought advice from coworkers 
beforehand).
231 The fiduciary duties of employees under holacracy are discussed in Part IV.C.
232 Cf. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response 
to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing in favor of a contractual 
approach to fiduciary duties).
233 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (defining an employee 
as “an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the 
agent’s performance of work”).
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service) and when not to work, and what work to do and how to do it.”234
Although the Restatement test includes nine additional factors as part of 
the test, the control factor is the first and generally receives the bulk of 
analytical attention.235 The Supreme Court has extended the control test 
beyond the common law to serve as the default definition for “employee” 
whenever used without further explanation in a federal statute.236
The control analysis aligns with several theories about the nature of 
the employment relationship.  Ronald Coase based his theory of the firm 
on the employment relationship.237 The purpose of firms, according to 
Coase, is to avoid transaction costs by allowing the parties to organize in 
a hierarchical manner without the need for markets, prices, or specific 
contracts.238 The control over employees was central to the firm: “If a 
workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go 
because of a change in relative prices, but because he was ordered to do 
so.”239 Coase then looked to the legal definition of employee to determine 
whether his transaction-costs theory was supported in practice.240 Since 
the “control” test was based on the employer’s ability to require its 
employees to take specific actions, he concluded, “[w]e thus see that it is 
the fact of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer 
and employee,’ just as it was in the economic concept which was 
developed above.”241
Others have highlighted hierarchy as a critical feature of 
employment.  Guy Davidov has argued that the lack of participation in the 
control of the enterprise—which he terms “democratic deficits”—is one 
of the three “axes” of the employment relationship, along with dependency 
234 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 404 (1937).
235 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
236 In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the Court said that “[i]n the past, 
when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded that 
Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by 
common-law agency doctrine.”  490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989). The Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) use the “economic realities” or 
“economic dependence” test.  See 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2012) (defining “employ” as “suffer or 
permit to work); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2012) (using the FLSA definition for “employ” and 
“employee”); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985) (“The 
test of employment under the [FLSA] is one of ‘economic reality . . . .’”).  It is generally 
interpreted to provide a more expansive definition to the term “employee,” one that covers more 
vulnerable workers who may have some aspects of separation from the firm but lack true 
economic independence.
237 See Coase, supra note 234.
238 Id. at 386–87.
239 Id. at 387.
240 Id. at 403 (“We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in practice 
by considering the legal relationship normally called that of ‘master and servant’ or ‘employer 
and employee.’”).
241 Id. at 404.
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on the relationship for the fulfillment of certain social and psychological 
needs and economic dependency that renders it difficult to spread risks.242
However, Davidov specifies that control “does not necessarily mean 
control of the employer over every aspect of the production process.”243
Instead, he argues that control means “the superior power of the employer 
vis-à-vis the employee within their relationship and the resulting inability 
of the employee to control her own (working) life.”244 These democratic 
deficits—the lack of employee power within the firm—justifies the 
myriad employment protections that are provided to employees.245
This traditional employment law two-step—employees are 
controlled by the employer and therefore deserve employment-related 
protections—is called into question by holacracy.  Under holacracy, 
employees have significantly more control over their working lives than 
they do under hierarchical systems.  Under a holacracy constitution, the 
firm delegates power to a myriad of roles within the firm, with each role 
having significant authority.  A lead link within a circle—the closest thing 
in holacracy to a supervisor—cannot “control” how the member carries 
out her role.246 At best, a lead link can assign a member to a particular 
role, but then the member has the authority to carry out that role.247 For 
example, a member with a particular role is allowed to turn down a 
particular assignment from a lead link if the member thinks there is a better 
way to achieve the underlying objective.248
Putting workers into this complex constitutional structure may 
remove much of the “control” from the traditional definition of 
employment.  But does that mean they are no longer employees?  The 
organizational web created by holacracy would certainly not seem to 
render the workers within to be independent contractors.  Rather than 
working independently of any organization, these workers seem to be 
working more closely than ever—bound by overlapping relationships and 
242 Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of 
Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 394 (2002).
243 Id. at 381.  
244 Id.
245 Id. at 360 (discussing the employment question as “how to define the group of 
workers that should enjoy certain protective regulations”).
246 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 50–54.
247 Id. at 52.
248 The example posed a request from a lead link to create an internal wiki for employees 
to share best practices.  However, the member does not have to accept the project and create the 
wiki if the member believes the role would be best expressed through a blog or other means to 
share best practices.  The lead link cannot override the decision; at best, the link could reassign 
the role or bring the role’s accountabilities to a governance meeting for more specific resolution.  
Id. at 53–54.
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responsibilities.  In fact, holacracy seems to be a better fit for the definition 
of a firm propounded in the “team production” model.  In an important 
response to Coase’s work, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz disagreed 
with Coase’s focus on control, authority, and direction, and instead argued 
that the firm coordinates production in the midst of a variety of inputs.249
Alchian and Demsetz defined team production as “production in which 1) 
several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of 
separable outputs of each cooperating resource.”250 As a result, team 
production is used when the coordinated effort increases productivity, 
after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring and disciplining 
the team.251
Holacracy is premised on the idea of managing team production 
through a constitutionalized structure.  Rather than depending on the 
direction and authority of individuals within a hierarchy, the contributors 
to the team can rely on the underling structure to manage their 
interrelationships.  In their economic model, Alchian and Demsetz 
proposed a specialized, independent monitor to ensure that the team 
members all contribute appropriately and are rewarded appropriately.252
That central monitor—the recipient of the residual profits—would be the 
firm.  Under holacracy, the firm takes on a life of its own; its organizational 
existence is the ongoing process through which team production is 
managed.  
Under a “team production” theory of the firm, there is little doubt 
that the holacracy workers would be employees rather than independent 
contractors.  As I have argued previously, “[t]he critical insight is that 
employment is defined not by control, but by participation—participation 
in team production.”253 Control should not be necessary or sufficient to 
the employment relationship.  Instead, employees and equity contributors 
have “cast their lots together to engage in economic activity that would 
otherwise be extremely difficult to tease out into separate contracts.”254
Holacracy workers are more empowered than those within a traditional 
hierarchy, but that does not mean they are not employees.255
249 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972).
250 Id. at 779.
251 Id. at 780.
252 Id. at 782–83.
253 Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 661, 705 (2013).
254 Id. at 706.
255 Even the Restatement (Third) of Agency recognizes the difficulty for the control test 
as to workers higher in the hierarchy.  “In some employment relationships, an employer's right 
of control may be attenuated.  For example, senior corporate officers, like captains of ships, may 
exercise great discretion in operating the enterprises entrusted to them, just as skilled 
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Of course, holacracy’s changes to the employment relationship may 
lead us to reexamine our legal construction of that relationship.  If, as 
Davidov argues, society’s regulations over employment are based in part 
on “democratic deficits,” to what extent can we reconsider those 
regulations in light of holacracy? As discussed subsequently in this Part, 
holacracy may wreak changes on existing labor and employment laws.256
However, for the most part, employment regulations will apply to 
employees whether they are under a holacratic system or a hierarchical.  
Once the definition is met, the employee then receives the panoply of 
common-law and statutory regulations, such as workplace safety, 
minimum wages, overtime, pension and welfare benefits, unemployment 
compensation, workplace accident compensation, and wrongful 
discharge.257 If holacracy engenders a more empowered and engaged 
workforce, can we ease back some of our current regulations and trust that 
employees will grab these formerly-mandated terms for themselves, as 
they desire?  
In my view, a transition to holacracy by all of the nation’s 
businesses would still not be enough to displace our current regime of 
employment protections.  Although holacracy does engender a more 
distributed system of power within the organization, it does not necessarily 
address the market power of lower skill workers within the overall 
economy.  The big question remaining on the table is what powers the 
board and the lead link of the anchor circle retain over the allocation of 
resources within the organization.  Holacracy can extend to the board 
level, and the board could be chosen by stakeholders, including current 
employees.258 If employees have more organizational power at the highest 
levels of the company, they will be able to better protect their interests 
through governance as opposed to regulation.259 However, if the board is 
a traditional shareholder-elected board, and the board has sole power over 
the choice of lead link for the anchor circle, not much will have changed 
in the superstructure of the company.260 Individual employees within the 
company will have more organizational power over their jobs but that may 
professionals exercise discretion in performing their work. Nonetheless, all employers retain a 
right of control, however infrequently exercised.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07 
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
256 See infra Part IV.B & IV.C.
257 For an overview of the employer’s responsibilities to its employees, see Matthew T. 
Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 837–45 (2017).
258 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 165.
259 For an extended discussion of the tradeoffs between employment regulations and 
employee power within the firm, see Bodie, supra note 257, at 867–70.
260 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 163–64.
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not translate to more power over issues such as wages, benefits, and 
protections against employer opportunism.  
However, holacratic firms may also try to take the employment 
relationship into their own hands and rejigger it through private ordering.  
Rather than seeking to push its workers further outside of the firm by 
labeling them independent contractors, Holacracy One, LLC, has turned 
all of its workers into members of its LLC.261 Under the operating 
agreement, workers receive Class P membership units, which provide for 
a guaranteed draw from the company.262 The Class P units can, under 
certain restrictions, be exchanged for investor shares.263 Because they are 
members of the LLC, the company does not consider the workers to be 
employees.264 Holacracy shuns the employee label, at least in part, 
because it sees the employment relationship as a “codependent parent-
child dynamic,” rather than a “peer-to-peer relationship.”265
There are also, admittedly, regulatory benefits to taking away the 
employment label and replacing it with a “partner” or “member” label.  So, 
can holacratic employers—pointing back at the “control” test—claim that 
their workers are not employees?  It is unclear if most companies—even 
Holacracy One, LLC—can shed their employment label by providing 
ownership interests to their workers.  Under some statutory regimes, 
owners of various stripes—partners, LLC members, shareholders—have 
come within the statutory definition of “employee.”266 The Restatement 
of Employment Law states that only those who “control all or part of the 
enterprise” fall outside the definition of “employee” if they otherwise meet 
the test.267 Following the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(“EEOC”) approach, the Supreme Court framed the issue,  (for purposes 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act) as “whether the individual acts 
independently and participates in managing the organization, or whether 
261 Id. at 190.  Robertson states that “everyone [at Holacracy One] is a partner in a legal 
partnership governed by the Holacracy constitution.”  Id. However, from the operating 
agreement, it appears that the business’s organizational structure is an LLC and that the 
participants are members of the LLC. See Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32. 
262 Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, § 7.4.1, at 16; Robertson 
Interview, supra note 33.
263 Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, § 7.4.2, at 16.
264 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 190; Robertson Interview, supra note 33.
265 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 190.  
266 See, e.g., Frank J. Menetrez, Employee Status and the Concept of Control in Federal 
Employment Discrimination Law, 63 SMU L. REV. 137, 142 (2010) (arguing that “under the 
common law of agency a bona fide partner can be and often is an employee regardless of the 
amount of managerial power the partner possesses, regardless of any conflict between the entity 
theory and the aggregate theory, and independently of any appeal to statutory purpose”).
267 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
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the individual is subject to the organization’s control.”268 Under either of 
these standards, holacracy members/partners would not be exempted from 
the definition of employee.  All holacratic workers are subject to the firm’s 
control; that is, indeed, the very purpose of the holacracy constitution.  The 
constitution may free individual members to do their jobs without 
intrusion from other workers, but ultimately no individual members—
outside, perhaps, the lead link of the anchor circle—have control over the 
management of the firm.  Thus, despite claims to the contrary, the 
Holacracy One, LLC, members are likely employees, at least for most 
employment-regulation purposes.269
Holacracy may challenge some of our assumptions about the 
employment relationship, especially the primacy of “control” in defining 
it.  However, it would not make sense to change the definition of 
employees to exclude holacracies and their workers, at least without 
further reforms at the top of the pyramid.  Holacracies better integrate 
employees within the system and provide employees with greater voice 
and control over their work life.  The next step is to look at specific labor 
and employment regulations and determine whether holacracy does, 
and/or should, have an impact on that regulatory regime.  
B. Labor-Management Relations
As discussed in Part IV.A, holacracy does not likely remove its 
workers from the legal definition of “employees” under common law and 
statutory regimes, even if they are provided with ownership interests.  If 
the workers are defined as “employees” under law, the statutory scheme 
applies.  However, the picture is complicated as to the application of labor 
law.  These difficulties flow from the central premise at the core of labor 
law, which is that labor and management should bargain over the terms 
and conditions of employment.  The preamble to the National Labor 
268 Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 (2003).  The 
Court endorsed the EEOC’s approach to this question, specifically in regard to its six factors for 
determining control: “[1] Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules 
and regulations of the individual's work, [2] Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization 
supervises the individual's work, [3] Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the 
organization, [4] Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the 
organization, [5] Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed 
in written agreements or contracts, and [6] Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, 
and liabilities of the organization.” Id. at 449–50 (citing EEOC Compliance Manual § 
605:0009).
269 For a discussion of the particular issue of LLC member as employees, see Daniel S. 
Kleinberger, "Magnificent Circularity" and the Churkendoose: LLC Members and Federal 
Employment Law, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 477 (1997).
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Relations Act (“NLRA”) states that the Act is designed to resolve 
workplace issues by “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their 
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of 
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.”270 The NLRA puts 
in place a structure whereby employees can elect a collective 
representative for their bargaining unit, and that representative has the 
power to demand that the employer bargain in good faith.  Collective 
bargaining is the engine of the labor law machine.
In order to have collective bargaining, you need at least two sides.  
American labor law is premised on a dichotomy between labor and 
management.  On one side are the employees, and on the other side is the 
employer.  Under the common law definitions, the employees would be 
everyone who works for the company, and the employer would simply be 
a fictional business entity.  But a fictional entity cannot negotiate.  The 
NLRA shifts the “management” employees from the employee side to the 
employer side.  Managers and supervisors represent the employer and are 
excluded from the definition of “employee” under the Act.  As Justice 
Douglas explained in his dissent in Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B.,271
which concerned whether foremen were within the definition of 
“employee”:
[Failing to exclude supervisors and managers from NLRA 
coverage] tends to obliterate the line between management 
and labor.  It lends the sanctions of federal law to unionization 
at all levels of the industrial hierarchy.  It tends to emphasize 
that the basic opposing forces in industry are not management 
and labor but the operating group on the one hand and the 
stockholder and bondholder group on the other.  The 
industrial problem as so defined comes down to a contest over 
a fair division of the gross receipts of industry between these 
two groups.272
A struggle between shareholders and all employees, rather than between 
management and labor, was not what the Act intended.273 Instead, workers 
were meant to bargain with their entrepreneurial core of the company—
those who set the course of the firm and the firm’s relationship with its 
employees.  
270 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
271 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
272 Id. at 494 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
273 Id. at 495.
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So even though there is no specific statutory exclusion for managers 
under the Act, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) 
and the Supreme Court have carved them out of the “employee” category.  
Managerial employees are defined as “executive employees who are in a 
position to formulate, determine and effectuate management policies.”274
The Board has also emphasized the need for managerial employees to 
“have discretion in the performance of their jobs” independent of their 
“employer’s established policy.”275 In some instances, employees who 
execute important tasks and exercise discretion in those tasks have been 
lumped in with management.  Large-scale buyers, for example, are 
managerial if they “are authorized to make substantial purchases for the 
[e]mployer” and have substantial discretion in making such purchases.276
In N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University,277 the Supreme Court held that the 
professors who participated in faculty governance were managerial 
employees.278 Arguing that the Act was “intended to accommodate the 
type of management-employee relations that prevail in the pyramidal 
hierarchies of private industry,” the Court distinguished the operations of 
“the typical ‘mature’ private university” as one based on notions of shared 
authority.279 As the Court found:
[The faculty’s] authority in academic matters is absolute. 
They decide what courses will be offered, when they will be 
scheduled, and to whom they will be taught. They debate and 
determine teaching methods, grading policies, and 
matriculation standards. They effectively decide which 
students will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On 
occasion their views have determined the size of the student 
body, the tuition to be charged, and the location of a school. 
When one considers the function of a university, it is difficult 
to imagine decisions more managerial than these.280
274 N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 276 (1974) 
(citing Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946)).
275 Bell Aerospace Corp., 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385 (1975).
276 Am. Locomotive Co. (Dunkirk, N.Y.), 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 116–17 (1950).  But see 
Bell Aerospace Corp., 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 386 (1975) (“While it is true that the buyers are in a 
position to commit the Employer's credit, the record reveals that the discretion and latitude for 
independent action must take place within the confines of the general directions which the 
Employer has established.”).
277 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
278 Id. at 679.
279 Id. at 680.
280 Id. at 686.
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It was irrelevant, said the Court, whether the professors exercised 
independent judgment; the key was that the university used their collective 
judgment in the process of its own governance.281 The Board has recently 
refined its test to determine whether the faculty “actually exercise control 
or make effective recommendations”282 over five types of decisions: 
academic programs, enrollment management, finances, academic policies, 
and personnel policies and decisions.283 Critical to this analysis is whether 
the workers exercise “actual—rather than mere paper—authority.”284
Faculty members at one school were held to be non-managerial because 
the faculty’s decisions on governance matters were frequently ignored or 
reversed by the academic dean or the college’s president.285
Applying the managerial standard to holacracy, it seems that either 
all employees or none of the employees would be considered managerial.  
The design of holacracy is to provide significant discretion to workers in 
making decisions within their authority.  Although the lead link of a 
particular circle assigns the roles for that circle, the worker holding the 
role gets to determine how to express the purpose and achieve the 
accountabilities of the role.286 In that sense, holacracy employees are 
similar to large-scale buyers—they have the authority to make decisions 
and the discretion to exercise that authority how they like.  And as a 
collective, holacracy workers have the authority to determine high-level 
policy for the organization.  Holacracy circles make decisions about the 
creation, elimination, or amendment of roles and sub-circles.287 Circles 
conduct governance meetings to resolve structural issues within the circle, 
as well as tactical meetings to address operational concerns and actions.288
Circle membership consists of the roles within the circle, a lead link 
appointed by the outside circle, and rep links from the circle’s sub-circles, 
so that all workers involved in the circle participate in governance.289
Although the circle’s facilitator has important discretion within the 
governance process, the facilitator’s role is to manage the process—not 
281 See also Ithaca Coll., 261 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1982) (holding that the faculty were 
managerial employees because of the way they “possessed and exercised” their authority); 
LeMoyne-Owen Coll., 345 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1132 (2005) (holding that the faculty were 
managerial employees because they exercised “substantial authority in a majority of critical 
areas”).  
282 Pac. Lutheran Univ. & Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 925, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157, at 
*1 (2014).
283 Id. at *23–27.
284 Id. at *24.
285 See Bradford Coll., 261 N.L.R.B. 565, 566–67 (1982).
286 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 52–54.
287 HOLACRACY CONST., art. II, § 1.1.
288 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 58.
289 Id. at 57.
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dictate the outcome.  The purpose of governance is to allow all circle 
members to participate and to use the holacracy processes to arrive at a 
group decision.  Thus, if each circle exercises managerial authority in 
setting policies as to its own domain, then all of the participants in that 
circle are exercising managerial authority.  
There are similar questions as to whom within a holacratic company 
would be considered to be supervisors under the NLRA and thus excluded 
from the definition of “employee.”  The term supervisor is defined as any 
individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, 
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or 
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them” when “such 
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use 
of independent judgment.”290 Under this definition, it appears that lead 
links would be considered supervisors.  Although they lack many of the 
traditional supervisory roles, such as firing or disciplining employees, they 
do have the authority to assign roles within the circle.291 As the test for 
supervisor is disjunctive, this authority is sufficient to fulfill one of the 
twelve listed roles and thereby meet the definitional requirements.292
Although lead links can also take away someone’s role, this is not the same 
as terminating them.  Holacracy does not have set processes for hiring; the 
organization is expected to develop these processes or choose a holacracy 
“app” developed for the purpose.293 If these roles were to be defined as 
circle governance prerogatives, it is possible that all circle members would 
assume supervisory power.  
The Board has yet to be faced with the question of holacratic 
governance.  Other self-management entities will face similar issues, 
although perhaps more dramatically.  At Buurtzorg, the teams of ten to 
twelve nurses are almost entirely self-managed with very little exterior 
input or oversight.294 At Morning Star, all employees have the power to 
make purchasing decisions or even to initiate the hiring process.295 Faced 
with these situations, the Board would essentially have three choices: (1) 
apply the current doctrine broadly and find most or all employees to be 
managerial; (2) apply the current doctrine narrowly and find none of the 
290 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2012).  
291 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 52.
292 See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW T. BODIE, LABOR LAW 63 (Found. Press 
2016) (discussing the twelve functions of supervisors that define their role); see also Oakwood 
Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 689 (2006) (defining “assign” as the “the act of designating 
an employee to a place (such as a location, department, or wing), appointing an employee to a 
time (such as a shift or overtime period), or giving significant overall duties, i.e., tasks, to an 
employee”).
293 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 171.
294 LALOUX, supra note 6, at 67–69.
295 Id. at 113; Hamel, supra note 25, at *9–10. 
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employees to be managerial; or (3) use the rough proportions of the current 
doctrine to find some small group of employees to be managerial, such as 
those who participate in the anchor circle.  Something along the lines of 
option (3) is perhaps most likely, if only to maintain the traditional notions 
of labor-management relations, but options (1) or (2) would make more 
sense, given the spirit behind the current doctrine.  
If the Board did approve a unit of workers at a holacratic company 
to select a collective bargaining representative, collective bargaining 
would then endeavor to impose itself over the existing holacratic structure.  
How would this work?  Although there is significant overlap between the 
two processes, there may be space for them to coexist without insoluble 
conflict.
Collective bargaining concerns the terms and conditions of 
employment for the employees of the bargaining unit.296 Although unions 
can bring other issues to the table, only terms and conditions are 
considered “mandatory” subjects of bargaining.297 Parties can insist on 
bargaining to impasse over mandatory issues but not over permissive 
ones.298 Neither party must accede to the other party’s efforts to bargain 
over permissive terms.299 Moreover, employers must bargain over 
changes to mandatory terms but need not bargain over permissive ones.300
There are other requirements to bargaining—parties must engage in the 
process, share relevant information, and be willing to entertain proposals 
from the other side.301 But the limitations on subject matter generally 
channel bargaining into matters that concern employment.  
Holacracy, on the other hand, is oriented towards the work of the 
business rather than human resources issues.  The taproot of holacracy is 
the organizational purpose; all governance flows from that purpose.302
Roles and circles are created to serve the primary purpose but develop 
individualized purposes of their own, along with domains and 
accountabilities.303 Governance exists to manage the ongoing business 
responsibilities—it is, in fact, a new management system.304 In contrast, 
296 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012) (setting forth the obligation to bargain over “wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment”).
297 N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (setting forth 
the mandatory-permissive distinction).
298 ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 292, at 134.  
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 125–33.
302 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 31–34.
303 Id. at 40–42, 46–49.
304 Id. (where the subtitle to Holacracy is “The New Management System for a Rapidly 
Changing World”).
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holacracy seems at times uncomfortable with the issues surrounding 
employment.  Despite the intricacy of its system, it does not have a specific 
process for hiring, firing, or determining compensation.  And since one’s 
employment relationship exists apart from one’s “roles,” there is even 
more of a separation between holacracy governance and collective 
bargaining.305
So perhaps collective bargaining could work within or alongside 
a system of holacracy by serving as an “app” for employment-related 
issues.  Robertson describes a variety of “apps” that are available to 
determine employee compensation under holacracy. For example, under 
the Badge-based Compensation App, workers are awarded badges related 
to particular roles and their service within those roles, and the badges are 
then tied to compensation levels.306 If an employee has an issue with her 
badge, she raises it as a “tension” at the appropriate governance meeting.307
The holacracy system is fairly ecumenical about compensation practices, 
suggesting primarily that holacratic companies move away from the 
traditional managerial prerogative over pay.308 Certainly, a collective 
bargaining relationship would provide one possible system for negotiating 
over terms on behalf of employees.  The problem would be: with whom 
would the union negotiate?  As discussed above, in a holacratic system, it 
is difficult to determine which employees are actual management.  Perhaps 
the best way to harmonize collective bargaining with holacracy would be 
to have the union engage in initial bargaining with the anchor circle and 
its representatives, and then negotiate for structures within holacracy that 
could serve the employees’ interests while staying true to the holacratic 
processes.  Roles could be left to holacracy, but removing someone from 
a role could be done through a holacracy-arbitration hybrid that would 
provide the worker with union representation while allowing the 
appropriate circle to make the final judgment.  Obviously, there is much 
more to consider.  And there is, of course, the undeniable tension between 
the two different systems of collective negotiation and dispute resolution.  
They may be irreconcilable.  But holacracy does leave some space for 
grafted processes, especially when it comes to human resource issues.  
One final labor law issue for holacracy to confront is whether 
employers using holacracy are committing an unfair labor practice.  
305 For one (fictional) depiction of being relieved of one’s roles without being fired, see
Silicon Valley: Fiduciary Duties (HBO television broadcast Apr. 27, 2014).
306 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 160–61.
307 Id. at 161.
308 Id. at 159 (suggesting that having lead links in control of compensation “creates a 
pull back toward conventional power relationships”).
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Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA prohibits employers from acting “to 
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor 
organization or contribute financial or other support to it.”309 This 
provision was originally intended to outlaw employer-based or company 
unions, which sprung up to block legitimate unions from gaining a toehold.  
However, the Board has extended the protections of Section 8(a)(2) to a 
broader range of employer-related phenomena than simply company 
unions.  Finding a Section 8(a)(2) violation requires two analytical steps: 
(1) determining whether the group, policy, or practice at issue is a “labor 
organization,” and if so, (2) whether the employer has dominated, 
interfered, or provided financial support to it.  The Act defines a labor 
organization as “any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee 
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and 
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of 
employment, or conditions of work.”310 Consequently, a “labor 
organization” need not be an independent organization at all; it can be a 
subcommittee of workers within the employer itself or an employer-
created plan of engagement.  The only additional requirements are that 
employees participate in some way and that the purpose of the 
organization, committee, or plan is to deal with terms and conditions of 
employment.  
With the rise of quality management teams and other participatory 
work models in the early 1990s, there was a wave of fear that these internal 
structures were in violation of Section 8(a)(2).311 And in Electromation, 
Inc.,312 the Board held that the employer’s “action committees,” which 
were set up to provide interactions between workers and managers on 
labor-related issues, were labor organizations that the employer 
“dominated” and “supported” by the employer.313 The committees—
dealing with absenteeism, no-smoking policies, the communication 
309 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2012).
310 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012).
311 The Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations – Final 
Report, U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGT. RELATIONS (Dec. 1, 1994) (“The 
evidence presented also shows that as practiced today some employee participation programs 
may be in violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA.”), available at 
https://tinyurl.com/ycxdpqpu; Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company 
Union" Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 125, 127 (1994) (“Recent rulings by the National Labor Relations Board[,] . . . the agency 
responsible for enforcing the NLRA, raise doubts about the legality of off-line employee 
involvement systems (and perhaps some types of on-line systems as well).”).
312 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enf’d 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
313 Id. at 997–98 (noting that the committees were created by the employer, staffed 
according to the employer’s specifications, and required to meet on work time at the employer’s 
premises).
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network, pay progression for “premium” positions, and the attendance 
bonus program—were to meet on a weekly basis during working hours to 
develop proposals for management to consider.314 The employees on the 
attendance bonus committee did, in fact, develop a policy, but the 
management member of the committee rejected it as too costly; they then 
developed a second policy, which was never presented to the president.315
Would holacracy governance circles similarly violate Section
8(a)(2)?  Probably not.  Holacracy is not a system that allows workers to 
interact or “deal with” management—instead, holacracy replaces 
management.  The Board has held that employers may avoid the “dealing 
with” prong of the labor-organization definition by delegating managerial 
tasks completely to employees or employee groups.  In Crown Cork & 
Seal Co.,316 the employer utilized four production teams and three 
administrative committees to manage a variety of workplace issues.  The 
teams had the authority to stop production lines, allocate training 
assignments, and even administer the employee absentee program.317
Upper-level management did reserve some authority to review these 
decisions, but it deferred to the teams in almost every case.318 Similarly, 
the three administrative committees had their own bailiwicks of authority, 
and they each made recommendations to the higher-ranked Management 
Team on matters of plant discipline, certification raises, and plant 
safety.319 The recommendations were rarely, if ever, not followed.  
Because the teams and committees had authority “comparable to that of 
the front-line supervisor,” the Board found that they were not labor 
organizations.320 Holacracy circles have even more authority than the 
teams in Crown Cork & Seal; delegated discretion is essentially 
unreviewable, unless and until it is redelegated.  By transferring power so 
completely to the holacracy constitution and the power-sharing 
governance processes it creates, holacratic companies should be able to 
dodge any Section 8(a)(2) ramifications.  
Thus, we end where we began—with the ramifications of holacracy 
as a new system of management and governance.  Because holacracy 
endeavors to replace traditional management with a governance process, 
it unsettles the standard paradigm for labor-management relations.  While 
314 Id.
315 Id. at 991–92.
316 334 N.L.R.B. 699 (2001).
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 699–700.
320 Id. at 701; cf. Keeler Brass Co., 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1114 (1995) (finding an 
employee-grievance committee to be a labor organization because the committee’s grievance 
decision was rejected by management and sent back for further proceedings).
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collective bargaining and holacracy could potentially coexist, the two 
systems would need to amend their approaches in significant and, perhaps, 
unsustainable ways.  Holacracy endeavors to upend the traditional system 
of hierarchical management which collective bargaining currently 
assumes.  A hybrid is possible—but it is unclear whether partisans from 
either side would accede to such a hybrid.
C. Employee Fiduciary Duties
Do employees owe fiduciary duties to their employers?  The law is 
currently unsettled.  Under traditional agency law, employees are agents 
of their employers and owe an agent’s fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
performance.321 However, a set of recent cases have held that employees 
lower down in the organizational hierarchy do not owe fiduciary duties.322
The recent Restatement of Employment Law applies the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty only to employees “in a position of trust and confidence.”323 Other 
employees have only a limited duty of loyalty with respect to trade secrets 
or a contractual duty of loyalty.324 The Restatement avers that: “As a 
general matter, the duty of loyalty stated in this Section has little practical 
application to the employer’s ‘rank-and-file’ employees . . . .”325
The policy dispute underlying this confusion concerns the relative 
obligations that employees and employers owe to each other.  Under a 
traditional principal-agent relationship, the agent is charged with 
321 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“[A]n 
employee is an agent . . . .”); id. §§ 8.02–8.06 (duty of loyalty); id. §§ 8.07–8.12 (duty of 
performance).
322 See, e.g., TalentBurst, Inc. v. Collabera, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 (D. Mass. 
2008) (examining Massachusetts law to conclude that “the duty of loyalty does not extend to 
‘rank-and-file’ employees under Massachusetts law, absent special circumstances indicating 
they held a position of ‘trust and confidence’”); Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 708 (N.C. 
2001) (holding that the circumstances regarding the employment relationship in question were 
akin to “virtually all employer-employee relationships” and were therefore “inadequate to 
establish [the employee’s] obligations as fiduciary in nature”);  see also Michael Selmi, The 
Restatement’s Supersized Duty of Loyalty Provision, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 395, 402–
03 (2012) (“[S]ome, though not many, courts [ ] hold that at-will employees owe no duty [of 
loyalty] to their employer, while many other courts impose only a limited duty of loyalty on at-
will employees, for to do otherwise would go beyond what the parties presumably bargained for 
. . . .”).
323 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
324 Id. (“Other employees who come into possession of the employer’s trade secrets owe 
a limited fiduciary duty of loyalty with regard to those trade secrets. In addition, employees may, 
depending on the nature of the employment position, owe an implied contractual duty of loyalty 
to the employer in matters related to their employment.”).
325 Id. § 8.01 cmt. A; see also Aditi Bagchi, Exit, Choice, and Employee Loyalty in 
CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 271, 278 (Paul Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016) 
(“Most states in the United States have abandoned the fiduciary model of employment.”).
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responsibility on behalf of the principal and therefore must carry out this 
responsibility appropriately.326 The fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
performance ensure that the agent act with the principal’s best interests at 
heart.  Going back to its origins in master and servant law, the employment 
relationship was a special subcategory of the agency relationship in which 
the servant acted on behalf of the master, subject to the master’s control.327
The master-servant relationship made the master liable for the servant’s 
actions under respondeat superior, but it also had the effect of making the 
servant responsible to the master as a fiduciary.328 Because the servant 
could bind the master and was often charged with managing the master’s 
property or affairs, the servant had to act in the interests of the master.
From the perspective of agency theory, employees clearly have 
discretion over their employer’s property and business interests and must 
therefore have responsibility to use those assets in a way that benefits the 
employer.  However, when taking a more modern view to the employment 
relationship, the employee’s vulnerabilities are highlighted.  Employees 
work under a default rule of employment at-will, meaning the employer 
can fire them at any time.329 Notions of lifetime employment and 
corporate loyalty to employees are much less common amongst 
employers.330 Many commentators now feel it would be dangerously one-
sided to enrobe employees with fiduciary responsibilities when employers 
can drop them on a moment’s notice.331
The theory behind employee fiduciary duties has always rested on 
something of a conundrum.  The common-law definition of employment 
centers on the employer’s right to physical control over the employee’s 
326 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.07 cmt b (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
327 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“A 
master is a species of principal, and a servant is a species of agent.”); see also id. § 220(1) 
(defining “servant”).
328 Id.
329 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
330 KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION 
FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 67-86 (2004).
331 See, e.g., Bagchi, supra note 325, at 278 (“[E]mployees should not be subject to any 
fiduciary duty to their employers by virtue of their employment per se.”); Catherine Fisk & 
Adam Barry, Contingent Loyalty and Restricted Exit: Commentary on the Restatement of 
Employment Law, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 413, 419 (2012) (“The employer owes no duty 
of loyalty to the employee and is free to pursue its self-interest by firing him to hire another for 
a lower wage or for better skills.  Yet the employee’s ability to pursue her own self-interest by 
seeking better opportunities is limited.”); Selmi, supra note 322, at 398 (warning against a robust 
duty of loyalty that “could create substantial barriers to employee mobility without any obvious 
or added benefit to employees”).
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work.332 The employee is thus almost an instrumentality of the 
employer—an extension of the employer’s will.  At the same time, the 
primary theoretical justification for fiduciary duties is the exercise of 
discretion.333 Because a fiduciary has discretion in the completion of tasks 
that inure to the good of the beneficiary, fiduciary duties are necessary to 
cabin and channel the fiduciary’s actions.  If an employee is controlled and 
has little discretion over her tasks, then there is little reason for fiduciary 
duties to come into play.  
Holacracy, however, reintroduces discretion into the life of the 
employee.  Each role has a specific domain over which that role has near 
absolute authority.334 But the individual role-filler exercises that 
discretion for the good of the whole.  As such, each role carries with it a 
responsibility to serve the organization and its ultimate purpose.335 This 
responsibility looks much like the fiduciary expectations placed on an 
agent.  Similarly, workers participate in larger circles that govern the 
broader policies of the organization.336 These circles have their own 
domains and accountabilities but ultimately exist to serve the 
organization’s purpose.  The participants of the circle have a responsibility 
to the whole.337
It may seem inapposite to invoke fiduciary duties in these 
particularized contexts of roles and circles within holacracy.  But workers 
332 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“[A]n agent 
employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the 
performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master.”); see 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (defining an 
employee as “an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means 
of the agent’s performance of work”).
333 See Bodie, supra note 257, at 855 (“Many of the most prominent fiduciary theorists 
place the primary emphasis on discretion.”); D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary 
Discretion, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 610 n.6 (2014) (“The most commonly cited scholarly works 
in the canon of fiduciary law emphasize the importance of discretion in fiduciary 
relationships.”). For examples, see Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of 
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 915 (“[T]he fiduciary obligation is a device that 
enables the law to respond to a range of situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one person's 
discretion ought to be controlled because of the characteristics of that person's relationship with 
another.”); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 262 (2011) 
(defining fiduciary relationship as “one in which one party (the fiduciary) enjoys discretionary 
power over the significant practical interests of another (the beneficiary)”); D. Gordon Smith, 
The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2002) (arguing 
that “fiduciary relationships form when one party (the ‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another party 
(the ‘beneficiary’) while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the 
beneficiary”) (emphasis omitted).
334 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 80–82.
335 Id. at 85.
336 Id. at 48.
337 Id. at 47 (“[A] circle that behaves as if it were fully autonomous will harm the system, 
just as a cell in the body that disregards the larger system becomes cancer.”).
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in a holacratic firm participate in the life of the organization in a way that 
workers in a hierarchical firm do not.  In some ways, holacratic workers 
are more akin to partners than employees; partners owe reciprocal 
fiduciary duties to the partnership as a separate entity as well as to their 
fellow partners in the aggregate.338 Creating duties of performance and 
loyalty for holacracy participants may smooth some of the bumps that are 
created by the pockets of discretion within the organization.339
There is a catch, though.  Fiduciary duties are imposed upon 
contracting parties and add to, if not override, the underlying agreement. 
But the Holacracy Constitution is a system of governance that endeavors 
to provide a comprehensive approach for firm governance.  Holacratic 
firms may prefer to resolve employee duties through internal processes, 
rather than resorting to judicially enforced duties.  For example, if a 
worker is potentially breaching her duty of loyalty by working at another 
firm, the company may prefer to handle it as a “tension” that is resolved 
through a circle governance meeting.340 Resorting to the courts may be 
characterized as opting out of the game and relying on outsiders to take 
care of internal affairs.  Perhaps that is why Holacracy One, LLC, 
disclaims all fiduciary duties outside of the duty of good faith for its 
managers.341 But this disclaimer reinforces the idea of holacracy itself as 
an agreement—a governance agreement between the participants in the 
firm. 
D. Holacracy as Employment Contract
The use of a constitution is essential to the holacracy system.  The 
first step in transitioning to holacracy is adopting the Holacracy 
Constitution.342 Ratifying the constitution is not framed as a run-of-the-
mill employer human resources decision; rather, the choice is intended to 
be formal and binding.  The company must choose to place its managerial 
authority within the governance structure created within the 
338 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON 
PARTNERSHIP § 6.07(a) (2004); see also Smith, supra note 333, at 1457. 
339 See Bodie, supra note 257, at 868–69 (arguing that employees who participate in 
firm governance should be expected to owe more robust fiduciary duties to the firm).
340 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 111–13 (discussing the processing of tensions).
341 Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, § 3.5 at 9 (“Any fiduciary duties 
that the Managers may have to the Members shall be limited and eliminated to the fullest extent 
permitted by applicable law, except that the Managers shall have the fiduciary duties of good 
faith and fair dealing in any relationship with such Members.”).
342 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 151.
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Constitution.343 The decision must be transparent and the Constitution 
must be signed, published, and made available to all involved.344 Only 
then is the Constitution binding.  The shift from a hierarchy of people to a 
constitution of roles and processes is the critical move.345 The powers that 
were individually held by the CEO, officers, managers, supervisors, and 
individual employees are now transferred to the holacratic structure.  The 
“Adoption Declaration” found in the prototype Holacracy Constitution 
requires the ratifiers to sign under the declaration in which they “adopt the 
Holacracy Constitution” and “thereby cede their authority into the 
Constitution’s processes.”346 And Section 5.1 of the Constitution similarly 
provides that the ratifiers “cede their authority to govern and run the 
Organization or direct its Partners, and may no longer do so except through 
the authority granted to them under the Constitution’s rules and 
processes.”347
Although the Constitution is intended to bind the organization, it is 
unclear to what extent the organization is legally bound.  In terms of 
changing the Constitution or terminating it, Section 5.5 provides that the 
ratifiers may amend the Constitution or repeal it entirely “using whatever 
authority and process they relied on to adopt it.”348 The only requirement 
appears to be notification: the changes must be in writing and published in 
a way that is accessible to all of those in the organization.  This process 
does allow the ratifiers a way out if they regret the transition to 
holacracy.349 Robertson stresses, however, that the Constitution is binding 
as long as it is in effect.350 If it has not been terminated through the 
appropriate process, it remains controlling.  
But if we assume that the Constitution has been adopted by 
company representatives and remains in force, we must confront the 
question of whether it is legally enforceable.  If the company 
representatives disregard the processes or follow them improperly, the 
343 Id. (“In order to adopt Holacracy as a new power structure for your organization (or 
team/department), you must first have whoever formally holds power clearly cede that power to 
Holacracy’s ‘rules of the game.’”).
344 Id. at 152 (“Everyone needs to know that the current power holder has formally ceded 
power.”).
345 Id. at 146 (“Either a manager declares what rules or processes will be used, or 
managers are bound by the constitution and no longer have the authority to make such 
declarations.”).
346 HOLACRACY CONST., Const. Adoption Declaration.
347 HOLACRACY CONST., art. V, § 1.
348 Id. § 5.
349 If the ratifiers choose a complicated process for ratification—for example, a majority 
vote amongst employees—then they may not be able to escape holacracy so easily.
350 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 152 (“[The CEO] can retain the right to ‘unadopt’ 
Holacracy at any point and go back to the old way of running things, but not to override specific 
constitutional rules in the meantime.”).
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Holacracy Constitution itself has mechanisms for challenging the 
actions.351 These are clearly holacracy’s preferred avenues for dispute 
resolution.  But if these holacratic processes break down and the 
constitutional breach remains unaddressed, a participant may seek legal 
enforcement of the constitutional provisions.  Such a legal action would 
make particular sense when a worker has suffered a loss of role, a 
demotion, a loss in pay, or termination.  In such instances, the 
constitutional violation has not merely broken an internal role but has also 
led to concrete and cognizable injury.  
The Holacracy Constitution looks a lot like other types of employer 
policies or documents that provide a roadmap to the firm’s internal 
governance.  The employment relationship, though contractual, is often 
informally created with no specific written contract to control its terms.  
The basics of compensation and job responsibilities will likely be 
hammered out, but peripheral matters are many times left open.  In the 
midst of this uncertainty, courts have developed certain default rules like 
employment at-will to manage the contractual terms.352 In addition, 
employers may provide guidance through employee manuals, handbooks, 
policy statements, or other internal distributions that purport to explain or 
provide for certain aspects of the employment relationship.  These 
employer distributions provide guidance to managers, supervisors, and 
employees about the firm’s structure and the policies that guide its inner 
workings.353
Employees have primarily turned to these manuals or other policy 
statements to enforce procedural safeguards against adverse employment 
actions, particularly termination.  Prior to the 1980s, courts generally 
ignored employer statements about employment terms made outside the 
context of a written contract.354 However, courts eventually began to take 
351 The Constitution gives primary responsibility to a circle’s secretary for interpreting 
the Constitution with respect to circle matters.  HOLACRACY CONST., art. III, § 4.  When a circle 
nevertheless continues with actions that conflict with the constitutional rules, the Constitution 
provides that the outer circle (or super-circle) must take action to resolve the violation.  Id. § 5.
352 Employment at-will is more than just a default rule; it has turned into something of 
a sticky default. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 677 (2006) (finding the at-will rule to be “highly sticky” as a 
default).
353 Jennifer L. McClain, Ten Reasons Every Employer Should Have an Employee 
Handbook, 52 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 10, 10 (2010) (“An employee handbook is a set of 
written policies that can be a powerful tool for businesses. The handbook sets out all the policies 
that a company uses in the regular course of business, explains company programs, and 
communicates general information.”).
354 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.3, at 729 (5th ed. 2015) 
(“Before the 1980s, courts generally held that promises and statements made by employers in 
employment handbooks and manuals did not give rise to any contractual obligations.”); J.H. 
2018 HOLACRACY AND THE LAW 59
these statements seriously and treat them as legally enforceable.  In one 
line of cases, courts held that employers had created a unilateral contract 
with employees by distributing the manual and treating it as binding 
company policy.355 In another line of cases, courts focused on the 
employer’s creation of reasonable expectations as justification for 
enforcement.356 Although the routes to enforcement differ, it is settled law 
that handbooks, manuals, and other policy statements can create 
obligations that are binding on employers.357 The critical issue is whether 
the employer has evinced an intent to be bound by the policy statement in 
question.358 Such intent may be gleaned in part from a broad distribution 
of the statement to employees as well as the lack of formal, written 
employment contracts.359 But courts have generally treated such 
statements as non-binding when the employer includes a clear disclaimer 
Verkerke, The Story of Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche: Finding a Way to Enforce Employer 
Handbook Promises, in EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES 23, 27 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester 
eds., 2007) (“If you could travel back in time to the early 1970s, it would seem very odd, perhaps 
even preposterous, for an employment lawyer to believe that statements in a company’s 
employee handbook or personnel policy manual concerning job security would be legally 
enforceable.”).
355 See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J. 1985) 
(holding that “the manual is an offer that seeks the formation of a unilateral contract—with the 
employees’ bargained-for action needed to make the offer binding being their continued work 
when they have no obligation to continue”); Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 77 (Cal. 2000); 
Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987).
356 See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 
(Mich. 1980) (holding that “employer statements of policy . . . can give rise to contractual rights 
in employees without evidence that the parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would 
create contractual rights in the employee”); Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 119 
(Mich. 1989) (“[Written policies] are not enforceable because they have been ‘offered and 
accepted’ as a unilateral contract; rather, their enforceability arises from the benefit the employer 
derives by establishing such policies.”); Drobny v. Boeing Co.,  907 P.2d 299, 302 (1995) (“This 
rule rests on the principle that by using a manual or handbook, an employer secures promises 
from the employees which create a loyal, orderly and cooperative work force, such that the 
employer should be equally bound to its promises to the employee which are designed to create 
an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment.”).
357 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“Policy 
statements by an employer in documents such as employee manuals, personnel handbooks, and 
employment policy directives that are provided or made accessible to employees, whether by 
physical or electronic means, and that, reasonably read in context, establish limits on the 
employer's power to terminate the employment relationship, are binding on the employer until 
modified or revoked . . . .”); id. § 2.05 Reporters’ Notes to cmt. a (noting the “position of the 
clear majority of U.S. jurisdictions . . .  that unilateral employer policy statements can, in 
appropriate circumstances, establish binding employer obligations”).
358 SAMUEL ESTREICHER & GILLIAN LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW 50 (Found. Press
2008) (“It is often a question for the trier of fact whether a particular unilateral employer 
statement, or set of such statements, reasonably read in context, was intended to bind the 
employer.”).
359 Id.
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that the statement has no legal or contractual effect.360 Although the 
disclaimer may be washed out in the face of demonstrated employer 
signaling to the contrary,361 it is generally held to be strong evidence that 
the employer did not intend to be bound.362
In contemporary cases, disputes over employer policy statements 
generally come down to the power of the disclaimer versus the 
surrounding context.  However, there is no disclaimer in the Holacracy 
Constitution.  In fact, the Constitution takes pains to establish that it is, in 
fact, binding upon the organization as long as it remains in effect.363 Given 
the weight that holacracy places upon the Constitution’s binding nature, it 
would be almost oxymoronic to claim that the Constitution was not 
intended to bind the company.  All signals are to the contrary.  As such, 
the Constitution would easily meet the requirements that it was “provided 
or made accessible” and that it “establish[ed] limits on the employer’s 
power.”364
Of course, the Holacracy Constitution does not itself proscribe 
employment at-will, nor does it provide a specific approach to employee 
termination, demotion, or reduction in pay.  Instead, the Constitution 
provides a governance process whereby procedures for issues like 
performance evaluations and compensation are themselves developed 
through the system of roles, circles, and governance meetings.365 In order 
to bring a suit under the Constitution, the employee would need to 
establish that the governance system was not followed, and, as a result of 
that breach, he was terminated without the proper process.  It may be that 
the process established through holacracy was not followed;366 or, on a 
360 Id. (“All jurisdictions give considerable weight to the presence of a prominent 
disclaimer.”); Verkerke, supra note 354, at 24 (“By indicating clearly that the handbook was not 
intended to have contractual effect . . . , employers could opt out of these newly discovered 
contractual obligations and thus restore the long-standing rule of employment at will.”).
361 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“Any 
such disclaimer should be viewed, of course, in the context of the entire statement, other 
employer policies, and the employer's course of conduct.”).
362 Id. § 2.05 Reporters’ Notes to cmt. c (“All jurisdictions give considerable weight to 
the presence of a prominent disclaimer in the employer statement as evidence that the statement 
is not a binding commitment.”).
363 HOLACRACY CONST., art. V, § 1 (providing that the ratifiers “cede their authority to 
govern and run the Organization or direct its Partners, and may no longer do so except through 
the authority granted to them under the Constitution’s rules and processes”).
364 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
365 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 158 (“[T]he Holacracy constitution gives you an 
underlying platform, or a meta-process—a set of core rules for defining, evolving, and enacting 
your business processes over time.”).
366 As an example, assume that a company follows the holacracy governance process to 
establish a two-warning discharge system, but the employee is fired without two warnings. 
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more meta-level, that the Constitution was not followed in setting up a 
process, even if that process was properly followed in the instant case.367
In either case, the sanctity of the underlying process was not respected, 
and as a result the employee can claim that the adverse employment action 
was a breach of contract.  Moreover, the workers in these situations will 
have the advantage of judges who come steeped in an understanding of 
constitutional process.  By framing the Holacracy Constitution as a 
constitution, holacracy gives its internal structure an even stronger sense 
of legality and a metaphor upon which to build.  
If a company was looking to avoid this result while still adhering to 
the principles of holacracy, it could emphasize that holacracy was an 
internal governance structure that was meant to be enforced internally.  
The Constitution has an internal dispute resolution system to deal with 
conflicts between parties, including conflicts over whether the 
constitutional rules are being followed.368 When adopted by a company, 
the Constitution could include language that the rights created under the 
document only extend to the enforcement provisions created within and 
do not comprehend legal enforcement.  Alternatively, the Constitution 
could provide for arbitration of all disputes relating to the Constitution, 
after any internal processes are exhausted.  The Holacracy One Operating 
Agreement provides that disputes under the Operating Agreement are to 
be resolved through a process of negotiation, mediation, and ultimately 
final and binding arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association.369 Given the complexity of the holacracy process, an 
arbitrator trained in holacracy may in fact provide better dispute resolution 
than a judge or jury confronted with “lead links” and “sub-circles.”  
However, employees may feel that the rights granted through the 
Constitution are undermined when only enforceable through arbitration.  
V. HOLACRACY AND FIRM LIABILITY
Firms are generally liable for the actions of their representatives.  
The idea of responsibility for the actions of another derives from English 
master/servant law, in which the master was liable for the tortious actions 
of her servant if such actions were undertaken as part of the servant’s 
role.370 The modern doctrine holds an employer liable for the acts of its 
367 As an example, assume that the employer set up a two-warning discharge system and 
the employee was given two warnings, but the two-warning system itself was set up by a lead 
link who did not follow the appropriate governance processes under the Constitution in setting 
up the system.
368 HOLACRACY CONST., art. III, §§ 4, 5.
369 Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, § 17.8, at 37.
370 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *417 (1765).
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employees committed within the scope of employment.371 Although many 
different justifications for the doctrine have been given, most justifications 
center around the responsibility for, or control of, the employer over the 
employee.372 When the employer has directed the employee to perform a 
certain act, the responsibility is clear.373 However, even when the 
employer has not directly ordered the particular action, it is still liable for 
actions taken when the employee is acting as an employee and on behalf 
of the employer.  This form of vicarious liability is justified on the grounds 
that the employer should be responsible for its actions as an 
organization.374 The organization “caused” the tort and thus must face the 
liability attendant to that action.375 Respondeat superior also provides 
incentives for employers to monitor the acts of their employees and shifts 
the risk of individual tortfeasor insolvency from the victim to an 
organization entity that benefits from the actions of the tortfeasor 
generally.376 Despite the somewhat fictionalized sense of “blame” placed 
371 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An employer 
is subject to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their 
employment.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Except as 
stated in §§ 410–429, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm 
caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.”).
372 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 
499–501 (5th ed. 1984).  Employers can also be liable for the torts of independent contractors, 
but generally only under one of three conditions: (1) the employer is negligent in “selecting, 
instructing, or supervising the contractor;” (2) the employer has a nondelegable duty of care to 
the public as a whole or the particular plaintiff; or (3) the work done by the contractor for the 
employer is “specially” or “inherently” dangerous. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 
cmt. b.  
373 Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 105 (1916) (“If 
a master choose to give orders to his servant, no one can fail to understand why he should be 
held liable for the consequences of their commission.”).
374 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 186 (1995) (arguing that vicarious 
liability “construes (indeed constructs) the doer as a composite: the-employer-acting-through-
the-employee”); Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis 
of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 565 
(1988) (“In most cases in which an employee commits a tort during the ordinary course of duties, 
no question arises as to whether the employee acted within the scope of employment. The 
wrongful conduct is plainly a consequence of the employment relationship and represents the 
materialization of a risk that is normally attendant upon such employment relationships.”).
375 Id. at 609 (“The scope of employment limitation upon respondeat superior liability 
may be understood in many instances as a way to limit the employer's liability to torts that are 
‘caused’ by the business enterprise.”) (emphasis added); see also Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. 
United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding a “deeply rooted sentiment that business 
enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be 
characteristic of its activities”).
376 Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1241–42 
(1984) (emphasizing insolvency); see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental 
Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1763–64 (1996) (providing a 
deterrence-based argument for vicarious liability).
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on the entity, vicarious liability is settled law, widely supported by 
scholars of all stripes.377
Organizational criminal liability, on the other hand, is much less 
common and less established as a matter of theory.  As a matter of basic 
doctrine, business organizations may be held criminally responsible for 
the misdeeds of their employees along the same lines as respondeat 
superior.378 In order to satisfy the mens rea requirement, courts have 
additionally required that the employee have acted with the intent to 
benefit the business entity.379 This basic and broad approach has become 
“firmly entrenched as, more or less, the across-the-board rule of enterprise 
liability for all manner of crimes.”380 However, courts—and particularly 
prosecutors—have in practice adopted a narrower standard of liability 
centering around the role of management in the crime.  This practice is 
reflected in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (“MPC”), 
which finds a corporation to be criminally liable if the criminal conduct 
was “authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly 
tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in 
behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment.”381
The United States Department of Justice, in a series of memoranda setting 
377 Schwartz, supra note 376, at 1767 (“Within the United States the current consensus 
in favor of vicarious liability (among both scholars and interest groups) is so broad as to make 
vicarious liability almost a nonissue.”).  For discussions of extending vicarious liability to 
controlling shareholders, see Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1247–50 (2002).  For an argument for 
extending liability to corporate officers, see Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” 
Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 
396–98 (2004).
378 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).
379 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962) 
(describing the requirements as elements of liability taken from civil tort law); see also Samuel 
W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1662 (2007) (“Under 
current law, a firm faces criminal liability for virtually any criminal act by an agent. The standard 
is respondeat superior: the master is liable if the agent acted within the scope of employment 
and at least in part to benefit the master.  In practice, this standard amounts to strict vicarious 
liability because almost any act on the job is ‘within the scope of employment’ and because 
courts have all but read the ‘intent to benefit’ element out of the law.”) (citing 1 KATHLEEN F.
BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY §§ 3:01–:11, at 89-145 (2d ed. 1992)) (emphasis 
added).
380 Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 475–76 (2006); see also Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836–37 (1994) (stating that the existing legal regime 
closely approximates a rule of “pure strict vicarious liability”).
381 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962); 
see also Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1103 (1991) (“This standard still uses a respondeat superior
model, but in a limited fashion: the corporation will be liable for conduct of only some agents 
(its directors, officers, or other higher echelon employees).”) (emphasis added).
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forth the standards for when corporations should be charged with 
crimes,382 has consistently required more than mere respondeat superior
liability.383 And in assigning appropriate punishment for corporate crimes, 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines”) 
assessed punishment for corporate guilt based on whether “an individual 
within high-level personnel of the unit participated in, condoned, or was 
willfully ignorant of the offense; or tolerance of the offense by substantial 
authority personnel was pervasive throughout such [entity].”384
Commentators have noted a change from vicarious liability to more of a 
negligence standard as to corporate management’s role in overseeing 
internal investigations.385
A move to holacracy will change the traditional calculus for civil 
and criminal liability.  The change will be less significant on the civil side 
where respondeat superior broadly sweeps most employee activity into 
the “scope of employment.”  The holacracy system of roles and domains, 
rather than positions, may allow companies to make stronger claims that 
the employee was acting outside the scope, since the roles more 
specifically define the type of activities expected, and domains more 
specifically set forth the zone of responsibility.386 Respondeat superior
rests on the notion that the employer has designated the employee as its 
382 See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Sally Q. Yates on Individual 
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing to the Assistant Attorney Gen. 4 (Sept. 9, 2015), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download; Memorandum from 
Deputy Attorney Gen. Mark R. Filip on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. 4 (Aug. 28, 
2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf; 
Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Paul J. McNulty on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of 
Bus. Orgs. to Heads of Dep't Components 4 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf; Memorandum from Deputy 
Attorney Gen. Larry D. Thompson on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. to Heads of 
Dep't Components (Jan. 20, 2003) https://tinyurl.com/y9f7mtrm [hereinafter Thompson 
Memorandum].
383 Some of the factors in determining when to charge a corporation within the 
Thompson Memorandum include: “the nature and seriousness of the offense,” “the 
pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,” “the corporation’s history of similar 
conduct,” and “the adequacy of civil or regulatory enforcement.” Thompson Memorandum, 
supra note 382, at 3.  
384 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(b)(1)(A) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2012).
385 See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-
Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 572 (2005) ("[A]t least since the adoption of the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) in 1991, the U.S. legal regime has been moving 
away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational 
liability.").
386 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 42 (discussing roles within holacracy); id. at 44 (“A 
domain (of which there may be several) specifies something the role has the exclusive authority 
to control on behalf of the organization—in other words, this role’s ‘property.’”).
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representative with regard to actions undertaken through employment; as 
in principal-agent law, the principal-employer has given the agent-
employee the authority to act on its behalf.387 Holacracy sharpens the 
delegation between employer and employee, requiring (in theory) more 
specific instructions to the employee.388 It should thus be easier for a 
holacratic company to show that an employee was acting outside of the 
scope of her authority.  However, courts have largely blurred the scope of 
the employment doctrine, generally finding the employer liable if the 
employee’s action was job-related.389 If the employee is acting outside of 
her domain but more generally in service to the employer, it is unlikely 
that a court would allow the employer to escape from vicarious liability.  
When it comes to criminal liability, however, holacracy’s change to 
the traditional management structure unsettles the trend in corporate 
criminal law.  Most companies use a hierarchical management structure to 
run the company, and prosecutors and courts look to managerial 
involvement to determine enterprise responsibility.  For example, the 
Model Penal Code requires the participation of “high managerial agents” 
to find liability; such agents are defined as those with “duties of such 
responsibility that [their] conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the 
policy of the corporation or association.”390 Similarly, the Sentencing 
Guidelines look to whether “an individual within high-level personnel of 
the unit participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the 
offense.”391 In a traditionally-managed firm, this focus on the upper 
reaches of the hierarchy makes some sense, as these actors makes the 
broader policy decisions and may be more responsible for the 
organization’s culture.  
Holacracy, however, eschews the hierarchical organization chart 
and instead installs a constitutional structure.  Circles create governance 
policies, and roles carry out their accountabilities.  Management is 
conducted through the structure and not through individuals.392 As a 
result, it will be difficult or nonsensical to assign organizational blame 
based purely on hierarchical culpability.   On the other hand, it will be 
387 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent acts 
with actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the 
principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal's manifestations to the 
agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”).
388 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 42 (“The Holacracy governance process generates 
clarity by defining explicit roles with explicit accountabilities, which grant explicit authority, 
and then continuously evolves these definitions to integrate . . . .”).
389 See Sykes, supra note 374, at 586–87, 609 (discussing the broad contours of 
employer liability, especially in “frolic and detour” cases).
390 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).  
391 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(b)(1)(A) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2012).
392 ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 34–59.
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easier to blame the corporation if the wrongdoer was acting within her role 
and domain on behalf of the company.  Holacracy empowers individual 
workers by assigning them roles, domains, and accountabilities directly 
from the organization’s constitutional governance structure.  The worker 
was not installed in her position by a supervisor; she was instead assigned 
a role within a circle and asked to manage the accountabilities of that role 
within the role’s domain.  It is thus easier to blame the organization as a 
whole, rather than the individual, if the individual committed the crime 
within her role.  The firm is more directly accountable.  
The holacracy approach also helps to resolve an ongoing tension 
within enterprise criminal liability over the tension between direct 
responsibility and overall authority.  As existing practice makes clear, we 
are more likely to assign blame to the organization as a whole if the 
organization’s leadership is involved in the crime.  On the other hand, 
many instances of corporate crime involve the activities of those who are 
lower within the hierarchy.  In the British Petroleum (“BP”) Deepwater 
Horizon disaster, lower-level employees made the mistakes that led to the 
disastrous spill, and some of those most directly responsible died in the 
explosion.393 At the same time, BP leadership was feckless and 
unprepared to deal with the accident’s consequences.  There is thus a 
dilemma over responsibility.  As Samuel Buell explains it:
The trouble with blaming the managers and executives is that, 
as in many cases of corporate crime, it’s difficult to pinpoint 
who within the massive, bureaucratic global organization that 
is BP both knew enough and was in charge enough to be the 
right target for blame.  This isn’t just a lawyer’s problem, a 
mere difficulty of proof. It’s a problem of responsibility and 
culpability.  The higher you go in BP, the more responsible 
the managers seem to be—but the less they knew and were 
involved day-to-day in the Deepwater Horizon rig.394
Under holacracy, on-site employees need not wait for directions from far-
away management, nor is management expected to be omniscient about 
its many jobsites.  Instead, responsibility is handed over to the structure 
and devolved to those more directly involved in the task.  Holacracy 
mitigates the tension between responsibility and authority; the “lower-
level” employee has more authority over the task and is thus more 
responsible for the outcome.  That might make the employee look more 
393 SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 110 (2016).
394 Id. at 111.
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individually responsible for the decision.  But since the employee is 
empowered under holacracy, and the firm itself has adopted holacracy for 
its management system, it seems fairer to blame the corporation as a 
whole.  
That does not necessarily mean that holacratic firms will be more 
vulnerable to criminal liability.  As suggested earlier, individuals acting 
outside of their roles and domains will look more like individual “rogue” 
agents than they would with a less defined set of responsibilities.  
Moreover, there is evidence that workers are less likely to commit crimes 
if they feel that workplace policies are legitimate and follow procedurally 
just rules.395 Although deterrence and incentives play a role in compliance, 
studies have found that employees are more likely to follow internal and 
external rules if they believe in the legitimacy of workplace authority.396
Holacracy fosters that sense of legitimacy by creating participatory 
processes that depend on the workings of an agreed-upon set of rules, 
rather than managerial fiat.397
We recognize that organizations, such as corporations, can be held 
blameworthy for acts that are committed by individuals acting within 
them.398 Holacracy helps make sense of this liability by moving away 
from a hierarchy-based theory of blame and focusing on a true sense of 
entity-oriented responsibility.  However, prosecutors and courts would 
need to move away from their notions of managerial responsibility to adapt 
to the new reality.  
CONCLUSION
The law takes the economic firm and places its participants into 
familiar categories: corporations, directors, CEOs, officers, and 
employees.  Holacracy unsettles those categories.  It challenges our ideas 
of internal firm governance, strips management of its traditional powers, 
and recasts workers from controlled subjects to participating players.  
Although holacracy is only one example from the palette of participatory 
395 Tom R. Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, 51 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 267, 267 (2014) (arguing that “legitimacy is important for internal regulation, as 
businesses with ethical cultures that are legitimate to employees are less likely to engage in 
wrongdoing”).
396 Id. at 277 (“Research suggests that certain values, such as legitimacy, can motivate 
self-regulatory behavior in organizational settings.”).  For an example of one such study, see 
TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS 190–92 (2000).
397 TYLER & BLADER, supra note 396, at 198 (“Many new management techniques have 
. . . made strides toward including employees directly in the process, increasing the respect 
shown to employees, and empowering those employees.”).
398 BUELL, supra note 393, at 115 (“Organizations cause bad things to happen . . . .  
When we organize ourselves into groups for even the noblest purposes, we can’t help but 
produce some ill effects.”).
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governance approaches, its fully-imagined scope and detail provide an 
ideal subject for testing the impact of the latest participatory governance 
thinking on existing legal doctrines.  The results?  The law can adapt to 
holacracy and its relations, but it will require a willingness from courts, 
companies, attorneys, and academics to understand these new systems and 
move beyond our existing answers.  
***
